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INTRODUCTION

The majority of important decisions in the area of domestic relations are made at the appellate level. This Survey year is no exception. The courts continued making inroads into the valuation of
corporations and continued their struggle to balance the Illinois
Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the "IMDMA") with
state statutes, such as the Probate and Adoption Acts, and with
federal statutes, such as the Bankruptcy Act. The courts also provided additional guidance regarding the proper application of the
IMDMA, including the constitutionality of both the state's nofault provision and its mandatory minimum support guidelines.
The dissolution of a marriage remains a highly personal decision
and proceeding. This is reflected by a recently affirmed decision on
the standing of guardians to bring a dissolution suit on the ward's
behalf. In addition, the numerous unpublished opinions entered
pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 231 also illustrate the personal nature of dissolution. This article will not confront the continuing controversy with respect to the applicability of Rule 23 to
the family law area;2 it merely presents the unpublished opinions
to provide a more complete picture of the judicial activity in the
area of domestic relations during the Survey period.
1.

ILL. S. CT. R. 23, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10A, para. 23 (1985). Illinois Supreme

Court Rule 23 states in pertinent part:
A case shall be disposed of by opinion when .

.

. (1) the case involves an

important new legal issue or modifies or questions an existing rule of law; or (2)
the decision considers a conflict or apparent conflict of authority within the
appellate court; or (3) the decision is of substantial public interest; or (4) the
opinion constitutes a significant contribution to legal literature by either an historical review of law or by describing legislative history....
All cases not required.., to be disposed of by opinion shall be disposed of by
a written order which shall succinctly state the facts, the contentions of the
parties, the reasons for the decision, the disposition, and the names of the participating judges. Orders are not precedentialand shall not be published. They
may be invoked, however, to support contentions such as double jeopardy, res
judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
Id. (emphasis added).
2. See Beyler, An Appraisal of Supreme Court Rule 23, 72 ILL. B.J. 80 (1983); ILL.
STAT. ANN. ch. l10A, para. 23, Hist. & Prac. Notes (Smith-Hurd 1985).
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II.

VALUATION OF CLOSELY HELD AND PROFESSIONAL
CORPORATIONS

A.

Value Determinations

The controversies surrounding closely held and professional corporations are predominately concerned with the issue of valuation
for the purpose of property distribution. While a closely held or
professional corporation may have no establishable market value,
it may nevertheless possess an ascertainable value for the purpose
of valuation and distribution of marital property.3 While Illinois
courts have refused to enunciate precise rules for determining the
value of such corporations, 4 the Illinois Appellate Court for the
First District provided factors that may be properly considered.
The appellate court approved the use of book value or shareholder's equity for initial determinations of the value of a closely
held corporation in In re Marriageof Kaplan.' The court further
recognized that, absent special factors, the book value or shareholder's equity of such a business is not conclusive of the corporation's actual worth.6 In Kaplan, the wife contested the valuation
placed on the husband's forty-nine percent interest in one of his
businesses.7 The court was unable to reconcile the trial court's valuation of the business at $180,000 with the shareholder's equity of
over $200,000.8 Because there was no evidence of negative good
will or of the likelihood of unprofitability in the near future,9 the
court asserted that in the absence of these factors or other special
considerations, the valuation of the corporation at less than the
shareholder's equity was an error. 10 The Kaplan court also concluded that the value of the corporation's good will should be added to its book value, and that the economic outlook of the
industry must be considered to make a proper valuation.l
3. In re Marriage of Merritt, No. 83-1477, No. 84-1163, slip op. at 3 (1st Dist. March
31, 1986); In re Marriage of Kaplan, 141 Ill. App. 3d 142, 148, 490 N.E.2d 69, 73 (1st
Dist. 1986); In re Marriage of Bauer, 138 Ill. App. 3d 379, 385, 485 N.E.2d 1318, 1322
(1st Dist. 1985).
4. In re Marriage of Mitchell, 103 I11.App. 3d 242, 248, 430 N.E.2d 716, 720 (2nd
Dist. 1981).
5. 141 Ill. App. 3d 142, 148, 490 N.E.2d 69, 73 (1st Dist. 1986) (citing In re Marriage
of Johnson, 106 Ill. App. 3d 502, 509, 436 N.E.2d 228, 233-34 (1st Dist. 1982)).
6. Kaplan, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 148, 490 N.E. 2d at 720.
7. Id. at 147, 490 N.E.2d at 72-73. The trial court valued the business at $180,000,
finding the husband's share to be $90,000. Id. at 148, 491 N.E.2d at 73.
8. Id. at 148, 491 N.E.2d at 73.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 148, 491 N.E.2d at 73-74. For a discussion of the proper valuation of the
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In In re Marriageof Bauer,2 the Illinois Appellate Court for the
First District approved the consideration of good will and the economic outlook for the particular business and the industry for valuation.13 The court concluded that when a business's worth and
future earnings are determined by factors which hinge on the contributions and personal services of the owner, a precise valuation is
futile and not required for the distribution of the marital property. 14 In considering the evidence of an on-going business with a
reliable and established clientele, goodwill, an increase in business
sales, and a stable economic prognosis, 15 the reviewing court determined the trial court's valuation and property distribution were
not an abuse of discretion. 6
B.

Inclusion of Good Will

Book value or shareholder's equity is an approved threshold determination for valuation.' 7 The inquiry, however, may proceed to
such controversial issues as whether and to what extent the value
of the corporation's good will should be included in assessing the
net worth of the corporation. Under traditional theories, good will
existed only in commercial and trade enterprises because the value
of a professional business was considered to be totally dependent
on the skills of the practitioner. 8 As the number of valuations of
professional practices increases, the vast majority of courts have
held that the value of a corporation's good will should be included
good will of closely held and professional corporations in Illinois, see infra notes 12-32
and accompanying text. The First District ordered the trial court on remand to specify
grounds for its evaluation of the corporation's good will and the corporation's prospects
for future earnings. Kaplan, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 148-49, 490 N.E.2d at 74.
12. 138 Ill. App. 3d 379, 485 N.E.2d 1318 (1st Dist. 1985).
13. Id. at 386, 485 N.E.2d at 1322. See Merritt, No. 83-1477, No. 84-1163, slip op. at
3-4 (value determinations based upon the earning histories of the companies and the
amount and availability of business assets used for the personal expenses of the owner
spouse approved); see also infra notes 17-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
proper inclusion of good will in the valuation of a closely held or professional
corporation.
14. Bauer, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 386, 485 N.E.2d at 1322 (citing In re Marriage of
Greenberg, 102 Ill. App. 3d 938, 945, 429 N.E.2d 1334, 1340 (1st Dist. 1981)).
15. Bauer, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 386, 485 N.E. 2d at 1322.
16. Id.
17. In re Marriage of Reib, 114 Ill. App. 3d 993, 449 N.E.2d 919 (1st Dist. 1983)
(valuation of a closely held corporation is not necessarily the book value, although book
value may be of importance in ascertaining market value); In re Marriage of Johnson, 106
Ill. App. 3d 502, 436 N.E.2d 228 (1st Dist. 1982) (addition of shareholder's equity proper
method of evaluating corporations).
18. In re Marriage of Kapusta, 141 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 1014, 491 N.E.2d 48, 50 (1st
Dist. 1986).
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when appraising the value of a professional corporation.' 9
Illinois courts have struggled with the issues of including good
will in valuing professional practices and of what constitutes good
will, often reaching contradictory resolutions. In In re Marriageof
White,20 the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District determined that in appraising the value of the husband's professional
dental corporation the trial court had properly included good
will. 2' Recognizing good will's intangible quality, the court concluded that it is of value to the practicing spouse, both during and
after the marriage as manifested in the amount of business and resuiting income.22
The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District rejected this
reasoning in In re Marriage of Wilder.23 The Wilder court found
good will, as defined in White, reflected in three of the mandatory
factors used by the courts when dividing marital property pursuant
to section 503 of the IMDMA: "the relevant economic circumstances of each spouse when the division of property is to become
effective," the "occupation, amount and sources of income ...

of

each party," and "the reasonable opportunity of each spouse for
future acquisition of capital assets and income."' 24 Defining good
will as the ability to generate income, the Wilder court found that
its addition results in a double consideration of this factor ("double
dip") and therefore rejected its inclusion as inequitable. 25 The Wilder court concluded that when good will is defined as earning potential, a court is not required to set a fixed monetary amount for
good will in valuing the stock of a professional or closely held
corporation.26
During the Survey year, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First
District reconciled these two decisions in In re Marriage of
Kapusta,27 holding that the valuation of good will did not give
double consideration to the husband's earning potential when the
trial court did not set a fixed monetary value for the good will of
19. Id. at 1014, 491 N.E.2d at 51 (citing Annotation, Accountabilityfor Good Will of
Professional Practice in Actions Arising from Divorce or Separation, 52 A.L.R.3d 1344
(1973)).
20. 98 Ill.
App. 3d 380, 424 N.E.2d 421 (5th Dist. 1981).
21. Id. at 384, 424 N.E.2d at 424.
22. Id.
23. 122 Ill.
App. 3d 338, 347, 461 N.E.2d 447, 453 (1st Dist. 1983).
24. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 503(d)(4), (7), (10) (1985)).
25. Wilder, 122 Ill. App. 3d at 347, 461 N.E.2d at 453.
26. Id. at 348, 461 N.E.2d at 454.
27. 141 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 491 N.E.2d 48 (1st Dist. 1986).
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the corporation.28 In Kapusta, the husband argued that the trial
court's valuation of his medical practice considered good will in a
manner contrary to the decision in Wilder.29 The Kapusta court
reasoned that while Wilder defined good will as the earning potential of the professional spouse, the Wilder decision did not preclude
the consideration of good will when it could be distinguished from
the earning capacity of the practitioner spouse. 30 The trial court
set no fixed monetary value for good will and indicated that it had
valued the husband's medical corporation with regard for the
"double dip" implications of earning potential. 3a The Kapusta
court determined that the trial court properly had differentiated
good will from earning potential and the evidence of good will was
properly included in the valuation of the husband's professional
practice.32

Kapusta indicates that good will may be included in the value of
a closely held or professional corporation assuming the courts are
careful not to consider the value twice. The Illinois Appellate
Court for the First District found that the court's silence regarding
a fixed monetary value for the disputed good will indicated the
double consideration restriction had been satisfied, arguably an unwarranted elevation of form over substance. It is possible that the
"double dipping" restriction can be circumvented by the use of language which defines neither good will nor earning potential. As a
result, the Kapusta standards conceivably could be met simply by
remaining mute.
III.

PROPERTY APPORTIONMENT

A.

Spousal Contribution

Various courts have considered the meaning of section 503(c) of
the IMDMA during the Survey period. This section provides that
the marital estate is entitled to reimbursement when one spouse
contributes significant personal effort to non-marital property
which results in substantial appreciation in the value of the non28. Id. at 1015, 491 N.E.2d at 51.
29. Id. at 1013, 491 N.E.2d at 50. The husband's witness testified that the practice
had a market value of $10,000. The wife's expert testified that the practice was worth
$553,000 based upon a multiple of gross revenues, a multiple of adjusted earnings, and a
capitalization of excess earnings. The trial court accepted the wife's methodology, but
changed the multipliers and valued the practice at $375,000. Id. at 1012, 491 N.E.2d at
49-50.
30. Id. at 1015, 491 N.E.2d at 51.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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marital estate.33 The marital estate, however, is only entitled to
reimbursement for that portion of the appreciation attributable to
the spouse's effort, and not for that portion which results from inflation or other external factors.34 Some of the issues which have
been explored include defining "significant personal effort" and
whose effort may be considered.
In In re Marriageof Morse,35 the Illinois Appellate Court for the
Fifth District held that a wife who worked an average of one to
three hours per day at her husband's insurance agency and became
involved in local politics to enhance the agency's business did not
contribute sufficiently to the appreciation of the business to entitle
her to reimbursement under section 503.36 The court concluded
that the wife's involvement did not "rise to the level of significant
effort" and did not lead to a "substantial appreciation" of the business as required by the statute.37
The court also asserted that the proper inquiry under section
503(c) is whether either spouse contributed a significant personal
effort toward the substantial appreciation of the business.3" The
marital estate may be entitled to reimbursement for any appreciation in the value of a non-marital asset resulting from the contributions made, for example, by the owner-spouse.39 Only efforts that
resulted in appreciation and were not compensated, however, may
constitute a claim for reimbursement. 4° If a spouse's salary reasonably compensates him or her for his or her efforts, the marital estate will be deemed to have been reimbursed.41
B.

Pensions

A spouse's retirement benefits are marital property in Illinois to
the extent that they were earned during the marriage.42 Military
pension benefits have not always been treated the same as private
33. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 503(c)(2) (1985).
34. Id. at para. 503(a)(7).
35. 143 Ill. App. 3d 849, 493 N.E.2d 1088 (5th Dist. 1986).
36. Id. at 854, 493 N.E.2d at 1091.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 854-55, 493 N.E.2d at 1092.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 855, 493 N.E.2d at 1092.
42. In re Marriage of Wisniewski, 107 Ill. App. 3d 711, 437 N.E.2d 1300 (4th Dist.
1982); In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 Ill. App. 3d 653, 397 N.E.2d 511 (1st Dist. 1979); In re
Marriage of Pieper, 79 Ill. App. 3d 835, 398 N.E.2d 868 (1st Dist. 1979).

556
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pensions, however, creating a disparity in dissolution cases.43 Nevertheless, some states, like Illinois, have divided military benefits in
the same manner as civilian pension benefits." In the 1981 decision of McCarty v. McCarty, however, the United States Supreme
Court determined that current federal law precluded a division of
military retirement pensions in state dissolution proceedings.45
Applying the McCarty decision, the Illinois Supreme Court held
that military pensions were not marital property.4 6 This allowed
military personnel to be treated totally different from civilians in
dissolution proceedings, and permitted a major, if not the only asset in some cases, to escape distribution. Subsequently, Congress
enacted the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act 47
which permits the states to apply pertinent local laws when determining whether military pensions should be considered divisible.4"
Following this enactment, the Illinois Appellate Court for the
Fifth District, in In re Marriage of Korper, concluded that Illinois
courts were free to apply the law relating to military pensions as
marital property as it existed prior to McCarty.4 9
Shortly thereafter, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second
District held that a military pension once again could be recognized as marital property in Illinois.5 ° In In re Marriageof Dooley
the husband contended that his military retirement pension could
not be apportioned between him and his wife because it was nonmarital property. 1 Nevertheless, the Dooley court agreed with the
43. Fenney v. Fenney, 259 Ark. 858, 537 S.W.2d 367 (1976); In re Marriage of Ellis,
36 Colo. App. 234, 538 P.2d 1347 (1975), aff'd, 191 Colo. 317, 552 P.2d 506 (1976).
44. See In re Marriage of Musser, 70 Ill. App. 3d 706, 388 N.E.2d 1289 (4th Dist.
1979).
45. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
46. In re Marriage of Musser, 87 I11. 2d 68, 429 N.E.2d 530 (1981).
47. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (1982) states:
Subject to the limitations of this section, a court may treat disposable retired or
retainer pay payable to a member for pay periods beginning after June 25, 1981,
either as property solely of the member or as property of the member and his
spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court.
48. S. REP. No. 502, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1982)
49. In re Marriage of Korper, 131 Ill. App. 3d 753, 755-57, 475 N.E.2d 1333, 133536 (5th Dist. 1985). The husband contended that the Uniformed Services Former
Spouses Protection Act was intended to create only a narrow exception to the holding in
McCarty. Id. at 755-56, 475 N.E.2d at 1335. The Korper court determined the respondent's argument was too technical and contrary to congressional intent. Id. at 756, 475
N.E.2d at 1335. The appellate court interpreted the Act as completely abrogating McCarty, thus overruling the Illinois Supreme Court decision in Musser. Id. at 757, 475
N.E.2d at 1336.
50. 137 Ill. App. 3d 401, 484 N.E.2d 894 (2nd Dist. 1985).
51. Id. at 403, 484 N.E.2d at 896.

1986]

Family Law

reasoning of the court in Korper, finding that that portion of military pensions earned during the marriage properly should be classified as marital property. 2
Once a court decides that a spouse's pension is marital property,
the court must determine the appropriate division and the mechanics for distribution of those funds. Courts have vacillated on the
appropriate equitable approach for the distribution of pension benefits. There are two common approaches: the "reserved jurisdiction approach" 5 3 and the "immediate offset approach." 54
The reserved jurisdiction approach allows for an allocation of
benefits in the future, if and when and in the amount they are payable. The immediate offset approach requires an evaluation of the
pension benefits, and awards other assets to the non-participant to
offset the pension benefits. Each approach has its advantages and
disadvantages. The immediate offset approach finalizes litigation,
allowing the parties to go their separate ways. Its disadvantage is
that it places all the risk of reception on the participant and emphasizes valuation where the principles of valuation are not clear
and amounts may be distorted. The reserved jurisdiction approach, or a variation of it, the "if, as, and when" approach, allows
a court to award pension benefits earned during the marriage if the
participant receives or is entitled to them, when he receives them,
and as he receives them. This allocates the risk of receipt between
52. Id. at 404, 484 N.E.2d at 897.
53. See In re Marriage of Degener, 119 Ill. App. 3d 1079, 458 N.E.2d 46 (2nd Dist.
1983); In re Marriage of Wisniewski, 107 Ill. App. 3d 711, 437 N.E.2d 1300 (4th Dist.
1982); In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 111. App. 3d 653, 397 N.E.2d 511 (1st Dist. 1979). The
reserved jurisdiction approach allows the court to order the employee spouse to pay a
portion of each benefit check to the nonemployee spouse if and when the benefits are
received. The court may retain jurisdiction to enforce the decree. Korper, 131111. App. 3d
at 759-60, 475 N.E.2d at 1337-38. This method for apportioning pension benefits earned
during the marriage was upheld during the Survey period. In re Marriage of Barnhart,
No. 5-85-0206, slip op. at 9-10 (5th Dist. 1985) (the "reserved jurisdiction" approach
provides security for the nonemployee spouse in later years, while a present value award
would likely be used to meet current expenses); In re Marriage of Dooley, 137 Ill. App.
3d 401, 406, 484 N.E.2d 894, 898 (2nd Dist. 1985) (military retirement payments should
be allocated as they are received by the employee spouse under the "reserved jurisdiction" method).
54. See In re Marriage of Degener, 119 Ill. App. 3d 1079, 458 N.E.2d 46 (2nd Dist.
1983); In re Marriage of Bentivenga, 109 Ill. App. 3d 967, 441 N.E.2d 336 (2nd Dist.
1982); In re Marriage of Wisniewski, 107 Ill. App. 3d 711, 437 N.E.2d 1300 (4th Dist.
1982). The immediate offset approach reduces the pension to present value and awards
an offsetting value of money or property to the nonemployee spouse. This approach is
best employed when actuarial evidence can be utilized to arrive at the present value of the
pension plan, when the employee spouse is nearing retirement age, and when there is
sufficient marital property to allow an offset to the nonemployee spouse. In re Marriage of
Britton, 141 Ill. App. 3d 588, 592, 490 N.E.2d 1079, 1081 (5th Dist. 1986).
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the parties and removes the uncertainties of valuation. It also may
entangle the parties and the courts for years and perhaps promote
litigation for years after the judgment for dissolution.
Under the "reserved jurisdiction approach," however, the court
must retain jurisdiction to determine what percentage of the pension benefits each spouse will receive. 55 This approach was at issue
in In re Marriageof Britton,5 6 in which the Illinois Appellate Court
for the Fifth District held that the trial court had improperly reserved jurisdiction for apportioning pension benefits because there
was neither agreement by the parties nor the existence of appropriate circumstances. 7 The trial court had reserved jurisdiction regarding the division of the parties' pension plan until the pension
became payable.58 The appellate court held this approach was unacceptable because it would encourage repeated litigation and create confusion regarding the proper division of the remaining
marital property because the award to each party was unclear. 59
Had the Britton court found otherwise, the trial court's failure to
apportion the pension may have rendered the judgment unappealable, 6° thus tying the parties to the courts and each other until the
employee spouse retired. The appropriate approach, if the court is
not going to use an immediate offset approach, is to reserve jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing specific awards made now,
whether in percentage or amounts of pensions to be paid in the
future.
Courts using the reserved jurisdiction approach must be aware
of competing provisions of the IMDMA promoting the finality of
judgments and concepts of the appealability of judgments. These
provisions are not always easy to reconcile. The idea of the reserved jurisdiction approach should not be to put off all allocation
issues, including the percentage of pension benefits each spouse
should be awarded, until another day.
55. Britton, 141 I11.App. 3d at 591, 490 N.E.2d at 1080. To preserve jurisdiction for
the distribution of benefits, the courts must comply with section 401(b) of the IMDMA,
which allows courts to enter judgments while reserving jurisdiction on an issue or issues
only when there is an agreement by the parties or a finding by the court of the existence of
appropriate circumstances. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 401(b) (1985).
56. 141 Ill. App. 3d 588, 490 N.E.2d 1079 (5th Dist. 1986).
57. Id. at 593, 490 N.E.2d at 1081.
58. Id. at 590, 490 N.E.2d at 1080-81.
59. Id. at 591-92, 490 N.E.2d at 1080-81.
60. See In re Marriage of Rosenow, 123 Ill. App. 3d 546, 548, 462 N.E.2d 1287, 1288
(4th Dist. 1984).
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C. FraudulentConveyances
The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District, in In re Marriage of Shehade,61 held that in a dissolution a trial court properly
may void a transfer of property.62 In Shehade, the trial court
voided the husband's transfer of his beneficial interest in certain
property to his brother because the transfer was illusory and constituted a fraud on the marital estate.63 The brother objected to the
trial court's remedy, contending that the trial court only possessed
the authority to award a marital property lien against the title
rather than voiding the transfer.' The appellate court stated that
in a dissolution action the trial court possesses the jurisdiction to
hear all justiciable issues related to the dissolution. 65 The court
held that the trial court had full authority to declare the assignment void 66 following a finding that the assignment was a sham,
subject to defeasance.67
D.

Partition of Jointly Owned Non-Marital Property
The First Division of the Illinois Appellate Court for the First
District held that a partition suit does not lie against real estate
61. 137 Ill. App. 3d 692, 484 N.E.2d 1253 (1st Dist. 1985).
62. Id. at 702, 484 N.E.2d at 1260. In another case involving fraud, the court upheld
the trial court's division of marital property, ordering the husband to pay the entire
amount of a judgment lien held by his parents on the marital residence. In re Marriage of
Los, 136 Ill. App. 3d 26, 482 N.E.2d 1022 (2nd Dist. 1985). The Los court determined
that payment was never made on the alleged loan, that the judgment was obtained after
the dissolution proceeding was filed, and that the husband never told the wife they had to
repay the loan or that his parents were suing on the loan. Therefore, the judgment lien
was fraudulent and the trial court acted within its discretion in finding the husband responsible for repayment of the lien. Id. at 30-31, 482 N.E.2d at 1025.
63. Shehade, 137 Ill. App. 3d at 699, 484 N.E.2d at 1258. The trial court previously
had entered an order restraining each of the parties from wasting, selling, conveying,
hiding, transferring, concealing, damaging, destroying, encumbering or otherwise dissipating the assets held in his or her name or in the name of another for the benefit of the
party. Id. at 695, 484 N.E.2d at 1255. The wife claimed the transfer was not only a
violation of this order, but was colorable, illusory, and a sham, constituting a fraud upon
the marital estate. Id. at 697, 484 N.E.2d at 1256. A sham transfer is one that is either
colorable or illusory. A colorable transfer appears absolute on its face but due to some
agreement between the parties intends ownership to be retained by the transferor. An
illusory transfer is one that takes back all that it gives. Id. at 700, 484 N.E.2d at 1258-59.
The trial court, based on the evidence and testimony, found the assignment of the property from the husband to his brother to be null and void and of no legal consequence. Id.
at 697-99, 484 N.E.2d at 1257-58. The court further ordered the brother to account to
the wife for all rents collected under his pretended ownership of the property. Id. at 699,
484 N.E.2d at 1258.
64. Id. at 702, 484 N.E.2d at 1260.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 700, 484 N.E.2d at 1259.
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owned jointly by the spouses if that property is non-marital in In re
Marriage of Wojcicki (" Wojcicki H "). 6 s This First Division deci-

sion followed an earlier appeal in the same case ("Wojcicki I"),69
and reached a conclusion contrary to the decision reached by the
Second Division of the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District in In re Marriage of Voight.70
In the dissolution proceedings between the Wojcickis, the trial
court found certain jointly held properties non-marital and
awarded them to the husband.7" The court in Wojcicki I affirmed
the trial court's decision, ordering the wife to execute quit claim
deeds to the husband for her interest in those non-marital properties.72 A few weeks later, the Voight court reversed that trial
court's order requiring the wife to transfer her joint interest in the
non-marital property to the husband.73 Based upon the Voight
holding, Mrs. Wojcicki refused to execute the required quit claim
68. 135 Ill. App. 3d 248, 481 N.E.2d 939 (lst Dist. 1985).
69. In re Marriage of Wojcicki, 109 IlI. App. 3d 569, 440 N.E.2d 1028 (1st Dist.
1982).
70. 111 Ill. App. 3d 618, 444 N.E.2d 694 (1st Dist. 1982).
71. Wojcicki II, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 251, 481 N.E.2d at 941.
72. Wojcicki I, 109 Ill. App. 3d at 577, 440 N.E.2d at 1033. Shortly after the marriage of the parties, the husband transferred the titles of the properties in dispute into
joint tenancy with the wife. Id. at 571, 440 N.E.2d at 1029. The husband testified that he
intended to prevent any possible difficulties succeeding to title in the event of the death of
either of the parties. Id. at 573, 440 N.E.2d at 1030. The court found that the affirmative
transfer of non-marital property into a form of joint ownership or commingling it with
marital property merely creates a rebuttable presumption of that party's intention to
change the character of the property from non-marital to marital. Id. at 572-73, 440
N.E.2d at 1030. Thus, a transmutation is not absolute when the subject matter is property acquired prior to the marriage. Id. at 573, 440 N.E.2d at 1030. The common law
presumption of gift controls, subject to rebuttal by "clear, convincing and unmistakable
evidence". Id. The reviewing court concluded that the trial court's holding that no gift
was intended was within the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. at 573-75, 440 N.E.2d at
1031-32.
73. Voight, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 627-28, 444 N.E.2d at 697. The appellate court upheld
the trial court's finding that the jointly owned property was the non-marital property of
the husband. Id. at 627-28, 444 N.E.2d at 697. The Voight court, however, reversed that
part of the trial court's order requiring the wife to transfer her joint interest to the husband and denying a partition of the jointly held property. Id. at 627, 444 N.E.2d at 697.
Once property has been classified marital or non-marital pursuant to the statute, the nonmarital property is assigned to each owner and the marital property is equitably divided.
Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 503(c) (1985)). The court concluded that parties' interests in property found to be non-marital and held in joint tenancy should not be
affected by the dissolution and property division proceedings. Id. Thus, the court held
the trial court has no general discretion to alter the fixed, separate interests of the parties
as it would in the case of marital property held in co-ownership. Id. at 626, 444 N.E.2d
at 697. Therefore, the trial court must consider an equitable property division and may
order a partition of the property. Id. at 627, 444 N.E.2d at 697.
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deeds and once again appealed the trial court decision.74
The Wojcicki II court rejected the holding in Voight. 75 The
court analyzed the practical effects of the Voight holding and found
the results contrary to the legislative intent of section 503(c), 76 re-

lied upon by Voight. 77 The Wojcicki II court reasoned that findings
of non-marital property under Voight would be rendered meaningless: when non-marital property is held jointly, the noninterested
party cannot be forced to transfer his or her interest to the true
owner of the non-marital property.7 8 Furthermore, the right to reimbursement for non-marital property contributed to an estate depends not on how legal title to the property is held, but rather on
whether the spouse transmuted 79 or contributed his or her nonmarital property to the estate. 80 The Wojcicki 11 court concluded
that even though the legal title to the property was held jointly, the
wife, who had not contributed any marital property to the estate,
was not entitled to partition."1 On the basis of these findings, the
Wojcicki I court ordered the wife to execute all of the necessary
documents to convey her right, title, and interests in the properties
to the husband.82
In declining to follow Voight, the court essentially favored equitable distribution under section 503 over the statutory right to partition. When the court allocates property in a dissolution proceeding, it must be able to enforce such an allocation. This raises
the possibility that parties may attempt to frustrate this judicial
power by filing a partition suit. It is unclear whether equity should
allow such interference with the mechanics of enforcing the court's
award when a division of jointly held property is before the court;
arguably this is not the proper role of equity.
74. Wojcicki II, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 249, 481 N.E.2d at 939.
75. Id. at 252, 481 N.E.2d at 941.
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 503(c) (1985).
77. Wojcicki II, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 253, 481 N.E.2d at 942.
78. Id.
79. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 40, para. 503(c)(1), Hist. & Pract. Notes (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1986). Paragraph 503(c)(1) (1985) provides that when marital and non-martial property
are commingled, the contributed property loses its identity, and its classification as marital or non-marital property is transmuted to the estate receiving the contribution. Id. If
marital and non-marital property are commingled into newly acquired property, the
property is deemed as transmuted into marital property. Id.
80. Wojcicki II, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 253, 481 N.E.2d at 942.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 253, 481 N.E.2d at 942.
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Division of Marital Property

The IMDMA requires the court to divide marital property into
"just proportions."83 Awards of "just proportions" do not necessarily require an equal division of the marital property and need
not be of similarly liquid property.8 4 In In re Marriage of Jordan,
the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District upheld a division
of marital property under which the wife's portion could be liquidated, but the husband's portion would not be fully realized until
1999.85
In Jordan, the trial court awarded the husband interest in contingent mortgage receivables payable in 1999, and awarded the
wife the marital residence.86 Contesting the division, the husband
argued that while the present value of the property awarded the
parties was approximately equal, the wife had the opportunity to
sell the marital residence and immediately realize the proceeds; he,
however, was forced to wait until 1999 before he would be able to
realize his share of the marital property value. 7 The husband contended previous decisions mandated that the parties should have
been awarded an equal interest in the four pieces of property.88
The appellate court distinguished the authority cited by the husband from the facts of the case before it.89 The Jordan court acknowledged the husband's arguments that there were certain risks
attached to the mortgage receivables.9" In this case, however, in
addition to the marital residence, the wife also was awarded a substantial portion of the mortgage receivables. 91 In determining that
the wife shared some of the risk, the appellate court held
that the
92
award was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion.
83. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 503(d) (1985).
84. In re Marriage of Jordan, No. 84-2848, slip op. at 4 (1st Dist. Oct. 31, 1985).
85. Id. at 5.
86. Id. at 3. The parties jointly owned four parcels of real property: the marital residence, a 20% interest in two mortgage receivables due in 1994 and a 50% interest in
another mortgage receivable due in 1999. Id. at 2.
87. Id. at 4.
88. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Korper, 131 Ill.
App. 3d 753, 475 N.E.2d 1333 (5th
Dist. 1985) (husband not required to pay his wife the amount of her interest in his pension immediately because the value of the pension would be affected by his survival for a
projected term of years, the preservation of his pension entitlement rights, and the constancy of the fund); In re Marriage of Smith, 105 111. App. 3d 980, 434 N.E.2d 1151 (3rd
Dist. 1982) (when debts owed the parties are questionable, the risk of repayment must be
shared by both parties)).
89. Jordan, No. 84-2848, slip op. at 4.
90. Id. at 5.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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In In re Marriageof Ryan 93, the Illinois Appellate Court for the
First District determined that an allocation of all the outstanding
indebtedness of the parties to one of the parties was proper.94 The
Ryan court emphasized that an equitable division of marital property need not be an equal one. 95 Because the majority of the debts
were created by the husband, and the wife lacked awareness of or
control over the husband's borrowing practices, 96 the appellate
court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
apportioning those debts to the husband. 97
The Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District, in In re
Marriage of Banach,9s held that the power to divide marital property granted by section 503 of the IMDMA 99 includes the powers
necessary to implement the division, and that the trial court may
be creative in this regard."°° In Banach, the primary marital property under dispute consisted of a restaurant and the adjoining marital home, which the trial court treated as one property. 1 ' In
order to liquidate the property, the trial court allowed each of the
parties a successive option to buy out the other party's interest.1
The wife, objecting, contended that the IMDMA permitted for the
division of property only by its subsequent sale. 103
The court recognized that courts generally have awarded the
property to one spouse, subject to a cash repayment to the other
93. 138 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 487 N.E.2d 61 (1st Dist. 1985).
94. Id. at 1080, 487 N.E.2d at 64.
95. Id. at 1080, 487 N.E.2d at 63; see supra note 84.
96. Id. at 1080-81, 487 N.E.2d at 64. The husband was allocated a debt of $103,000.
The evidence established that the debt consisted of $25,000 for individual income taxes
owed by the husband; $1250 owed to the IRS by the wife for penalties and interest incurred for late filing due to the husband's failure to provide her with documents necessary
for her to complete her return; $62,500 owed on a loan made by the husband from his
inherited business; and a $27,400 balance due on a loan from the husband's mother for
the purpose of financing another business. Id.
97. Id. at 1081, 487 N.E.2d at 64.
98. 140 Ill. App. 3d 327, 489 N.E.2d 363 (2nd Dist. 1986).
99. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 503 (1985).
100. Banach, 140 I11.App. 3d at 331, 489 N.E.2d at 366.
101. Id. at 330, 489 N.E.2d at 365.
102. Id. at 330-31, 489 N.E.2d at 365. The trial court found each party entitled to
one-half of the value of the properties. Id. After determining the value, the court granted
the wife the first 30-day option, followed by the husband's 30-day option. If the options
remained unexercised, the property was to be listed with a real estate broker at the value
determined by the court. If the property remained unsold after six months, it would be
sold at public auction and the proceeds divided equally. Id.
103. Id. at 331, 489 N.E.2d at 365-66. The IMDMA provides in pertinent part: "The
court may make such judgments affecting the marital property as may be just and may
enforce such judgments by ordering a sale of marital property, with proceeds therefrom
to be applied as determined by the court." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 503(i) (1985).
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party, 1°4 when division in kind is inequitable or inappropriate for
the type of property under consideration.10° The Banach court
held that this may be accomplished through
successive purchase
0 6
options, as proposed by the trial court.'
During the Survey year, the courts continued to take a practical
approach in dividing marital property. An option plan for distribution, as used in Banach, is particularly well-suited to those dissolutions in which both parties desire the property, but their ability to
make a cash reimbursement is questionable. 07 Additionally, as the
Jordan court noted, an award of the marital residence to one party
10 8
serves to more completely sever contacts between the parties.
An equal division of the marital residence would only spawn additional litigation regarding partition, distribution of the proceeds, or
an award of the value of the home.
IV.

MAINTENANCE

While the courts have a certain amount of discretion in awarding maintenance payments, the IMDMA establishes certain guidelines. 10 9 The IMDMA provides that an award of maintenance is
appropriate when income received by a party, from either property, employment or otherwise is insufficient to meet the reasonable needs of that party. 10 Property apportioned to a party is not
considered income for purposes of the statute. Nevertheless, inquiring into the income-producing potential of property apportioned to an individual is appropriate when determining the
necessity for and the amount of a maintenance award."'
104. Banach, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 331, 489 N.E.2d at 366 (citing In re Marriage of
Rossi, 113 Ill. App. 3d 55, 446 N.E.2d 1198 (1st Dist. 1983); In re Marriage of Leon, 80
Ill. App. 3d 383, 399 N.E.2d 1006 (2nd Dist. 1980); In re Marriage of Lee, 78 I11.App. 3d
1123, 398 N.E.2d 126 (1st Dist. 1979)).
105. Banach, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 331, 489 N.E.2d at 366. One example is an ongoing
business because a division in kind would force the continuation of a business association
between the parties. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Sales, 106 Ill. App. 3d 378, 436 N.E.2d
23 (1st Dist. 1982); In re Marriage of Hellwig, 100 Ill. App. 3d 452, 426 N.E.2d 1087 (1st
Dist. 1981); In re Marriage of McMahon, 82 Ill. App. 3d 1126, 403 N.E.2d 730 (4th Dist.
1980)).
106. Banach, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 332, 489 N.E.2d at 366.
107. Id.
108. Jordan, No. 84-2848, slip op. at 5.
109. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 504(a),(b) (1985).
110. Id. at para. 504(a). Further, the spouse seeking maintenance is not required to
sell or impair assets or capital in order to provide for his or her support under the statute.
In re Marriage of Marks, No. 84-0512, slip op. at 9 (5th Dist. 1985) (citing In re Marriage
of Thornton, 89 Ill. App. 3d 1078, 1088, 412 N.E.2d 1336, 1344 (4th Dist. 1980); In re
Marriage of Lloyd, 81 Ill. App. 3d 311, 401 N.E.2d 328 (5th Dist. 1980)).
111. See In re Marriage of Marks, No. 84-0512, slip op. at 9.
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In In re Marriage of Marks, 11 2 the Illinois Appellate Court for
the Fifth District rejected an award of permanent maintenance
which was to continue unabated after distribution of the marital
property." 3 In Marks, the trial court awarded the wife $250,000 as
her share of the husband's interest in the family business, to be
paid over a twelve year period." 4 In addition, the wife was
awarded a fixed monthly sum as permanent maintenance." 5 The
appellate court overturned the award because, in determining the
wife's maintenance needs, the trial court had neither considered
nor evaluated the income potential of the property apportioned to
her."16
The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District held that evidence of the financial status of the husband's current wife and the
corporation held by her was relevant and properly admitted for
determination of maintenance obligations owed the former wife in
Bronstein v. Bronstein.I" In Bronstein, the husband petitioned for
a modification, asserting that he did not have enough money to
satisfy his maintenance and support obligations." 8 The court determined that although the husband had divested himself of assets
of a closely held corporation, there were substantial corporate
funds available to him. '9 While the husband owned only nine percent of the corporation, the balance was owned equally by his current wife, his mother, and his sister. 120 Concluding that virtually all
of the proceeds of the corporation were available to him, either
through his own shares or through the interest of his wife, the husband was provided with sufficient funds to satisfy his maintenance
and support obligations.' 2 ' In addition, the Bronstein court noted
that any changes the husband's financial circumstances did not justify a modification of the22 maintenance award under section
504(b)(6) of the IMDMA.
112. No. 84-0512 (5th Dist. Aug. 15, 1985).
113. Id. at 9.
114. Id. at 2-3. In addition, the parties divided other marital assets by stipulation.
These assets included the parties personal property, marital residence and the proceeds
from the sale of out-of-state real property. Id. at 2.
115. Id. at 3.
116. Id. at 9.
117. No. 85-283, slip op. at 6 (1st Dist. Mar. 31, 1986).
118. Id. at 4.
119. Id. at 2.
120. Id. at 5.
121. Id.
122. Id. Modification of maintenance awards are governed by section 510 of the
IMDMA. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 510 (1985). The relevant factors to be considered by the court when ruling on a modification are those found under section 504(b) for
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In addition to being modified, maintenance awards also may be
terminated by agreement of the parties 23 or as provided under section 510 of the IMDMA.I24 There are three specified terminating
events: the remarriage of the recipient, the cohabitation of the recipient on a resident, continuing, conjugal basis, or the death of
either party.1 25 Failure to specify terminating events when maintenance has been set for a term of years can lead to unpredicted
results.
For example, in In re Estate of Bartlett,1 26 the Illinois Appellate
Court for the Fourth District held that the death of a party obligated to make maintenance payments for a certain period under a
settlement agreement failed to terminate the obligation. 127 In Bartlett, a settlement agreement between the parties required the husband to pay the wife five hundred dollars per month for ten
years. 2s The husband died nearly five years after the agreement
was entered; the wife filed a claim against the estate for the amount
due under the agreement.129 The executors claimed that the obligation was terminated under section 510(b) of the IMDMA beoriginal awards of maintenance. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 40, para. 510, Hist. & Prac. Notes
(Smith-Hurd 1980). Section 504(b) provides in part:
(b) The maintenance order shall be made in such amounts and for such periods of time as the court deems just,... after consideration of all relevant factors
including:
(1) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance.
(2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the
party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment;
(3) the standard of living established during the marriage;
(4) the duration of the marriage;
(5) the age and the physical and emotional condition of both parties;
(6) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his
needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance; and
(7) the tax consequences of the property division upon the economic circumstances of the parties.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 504(b) (1985).
Prior to this codification, the Illinois courts recognized the obligation to modify alimony awards maintenance under the 1977 Act when a change in circumstances equitably
required such a modification. Herrick v. Herrick, 319 Ill. 146, 153, 149 N.E. 820, 824
(1925). A change in circumstances sufficient to warrant a modification of a maintenance
award must be fortuitious and not caused by the party seeking the modification. Barrow
v. Barrow, 33 Ill. App. 3d 654, 342 N.E.2d 237 (5th Dist. 1975); Johnston v. Johnston, 9
Ill. App. 3d 247, 292 N.E.2d 39 (lst Dist. 1972); Blowitz v. Blowitz, 75 Ill. App. 2d 386,
221 N.E.2d 160 (1st Dist. 1966).
123. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 502 (1985).
124. Id. at para. 510(b) (1985).
125. Id.
126. 138 Ill. App. 3d 103, 485 N.E.2d 566 (4th Dist. 1985).
127. Id. at 106, 485 N.E.2d at 568.
128. Id. at 104, 485 N.E.2d at 567.
129. Id.

1986]

Family Law

cause there was no agreement by the parties to continue the
payments after death, and thus they terminated by operation of
30

law. 1

The court concluded that the parties set their own termination
date, apparently by their silence, preempting the application of section 510(b).'
The wife had foregone the possibility of receiving
maintenance indefinitely in exchange for maintenance payments
guaranteed for ten years. 3 2 Therefore,
the maintenance obligation
33
survived the death of the obligor.
The Bartlett holding surprised many practitioners who have
come to rely on statutory maintenance termination events. If
maintenance is intended to terminate on the occurrence of certain
events, each event should be specified in the agreement. For example, if the death of either party is intended as a termination event,
this should be clearly stated. Based on Bartlett, silence may be
interpreted as entirely eliminating the right to terminate maintenance based on these events. This leads to speculation regarding
the result when the agreement is silent concerning maintfnance. If
the result is the same, a person could be obligated to pay permanent maintenance forever despite the recipient's remarriage. This
area is ripe for further examination and interpretation by the
courts, though the Bartlett case clearly places an emphasis on careful draftsmanship.
The concept of maintenance (or "alimony in gross") has been
the topic of much commentary in the past few years. After the
IMDMA's enactment in 1977, many practitioners were uncertain
whether courts had the power to award maintenance in gross; they
were also unsure of the definition of the "in gross" concept. Previously, this concept, as it applied to alimony, provided for a fixed
sum which was vested, unmodifiable, and not subject to termination upon the death of the recipient.134 The IMDMA, as originally
enacted in 1977, seemed to eliminate the "in gross" concept.,
The legislature, however, included "in gross" in its 1982 amendment to the maintenance provisions of the IMDMA. 3 6 Recently,
130. Id.
131. Id. at 106, 485 N.E.2d at 568.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 40, para. 504, Hist. & Prac. Notes (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1986). See Canady v. Canady, 30 111. 2d 440, 197 N.E.2d 42 (1964); Ihe v. IhIe, 92 Il1.
App. 3d 893, 416 N.E.2d 366 (3rd Dist. 1981); Frank v. Frank, 34 Ill. App. 3d 957, 342
N.E.2d 404 (2nd Dist. 1975).
135. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 504 (1977).
136. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 504(b) (1985) provides that "[t]he maintenance
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the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of "in gross"
13 7
to be the same as the traditional meaning in the alimony context.
In In re Marriage of Burgstrom,13 1 the Illinois Appellate Court
for the First District upheld the lower court's decision to deny
modification of maintenance based upon a finding that the payments were maintenance in gross.1 39 Pursuant to a marital settlement, the wife was to receive $495,360, payable monthly for
twenty-four years, with an additional payment to be made on April
fifteenth of each year.14o The agreement contained no provision for
either increasing or decreasing the payments, although it did provide that the payments would terminate upon the wife's death or
remarriage. 14' The Burgstrom court determined that the inclusion
of the termination provision insufficient to qualify the payments as
maintenance subject to modification.'4 2 The court stated that
maintenance in gross may be combined with conditions that would
serve to terminate it. 143 Concluding that the agreement provided
for maintenance in gross, the appellate court refused to permit
modification. 1'
In In re Marriageof Cannon,"' the Illinois Supreme Court held
a maintenance order including a provision which reserves review 1of
46
the order for two years does not render the order unappealable.
Both parties in Cannon appealed the trial court's award of maintenance and division of property. 41 7 The Illinois Appellate Court for
the Fourth District dismissed the appeals, holding that the order
was not final and appealable because of the trial court's
retention of
148
jurisdiction to review the order within two years.
order shall be in such amounts and for such periods of time as the court deems just,.
and may be in gross or for fixed or indefinite periods of time ...."
137. In re Marriage of Freeman, 106 Ill. 2d 290, 478 N.E.2d 326 (1985) (maintenance
in gross is a non-modifiable sum certain to be received by the former spouse regardless of
changes in circumstances).
138. 135 Ill. App. 3d 854, 482 N.E.2d 383 (3rd Dist. 1985).
139. Id. at 857-58, 482 N.E.2d at 386.
140. Id.
141. Id. The parties had agreed that the payments would be deductible by the husband and taxable to the wife for federal income tax purposes and the court used this
provision to disqualify the payments as a property settlement in lieu of maintenance. Id.
142. Id. at 857-58, 482 N.E.2d at 386.
143. Id. at 858, 482 N.E.2d at 386.
144. Id.
145. 112 I11.
2d 552, 494 N.E.2d 490 (1986).
146. Id. at 556, 494 N.E.2d at 492.
147. Id. at 553, 494 N.E.2d at 491.
148. Id. at 554, 494 N.E.2d at 491. The maintenance provision of the trial court's
order stated that the order was to be reviewable no later than the expiration of two years,
and sooner if the parties' circumstances changed significantly. Id. at 553-54, 494 N.E.2d
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In reversing the appellate court, the supreme court concluded
that the trial court adequately had decided each of the ancillary
issues, including the amount of maintenance. 4 9 The supreme
court also concluded that the trial judge had provided for review of
that award because of the presence of other factors.150 The court
reasoned that the judgment was enforceable immediately because
any later modifications under the review provision could only affect payments accruing subsequent to the filing of the motion to
modify.' 5 ' The supreme court thus concluded that the inclusion of
such a review provision in the order did not render the order
52
unappealable. 1
While few Illinois courts have examined the validity of antenuptial agreements, a recent Illinois decision has upheld the validity of
a waiver of maintenence in an antenuptial agreement. In In re
Marriage of Burgess,'53 the Illinois Appellate Court for the Third
District validated an antenuptial agreement which contained a
waiver of maintenance, and where no significant circumstances existed that were outside the contemplation of the parties at the time
the parties entered into the agreement."' In Burgess, the agreement provided for a division of assets and a waiver of maintenance
or alimony after divorce. 15 The trial court awarded maintenance
to the wife after finding the waiver of maintenance clause unenforceable because it failed to provide for a settlement as an alterna56
tive to maintenance.1
at 491. The Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District relied on In re Marriage of
Leopando, 96 Ill. 2d 114, 449 N.E.2d 137 (1983), in concluding that custody, property
division and support are issues ancillary to the dissolution action, and as a result, petitions for dissolution are not fully adjudicated until all of these separate issues relating to
the same claim are resolved. In re Marriage of Cannon, 132 Ill. App. 3d 821, 823, 477
N.E.2d 716, 718 (4th Dist. 1985). In Leopando,'a custody order was found not final or
appealable because the issues of maintenance, property division and attorney fees had not
been resolved. Leopando, 96 I11.2d at 118, 449 N.E.2d at 140. See supra notes 350-360
and accompanying text for further discussion of the application of Leopando. The Illinois
Supreme Court refused to apply Leopando to the facts of Cannon. Cannon, 112 Ill. 2d at
555, 494 N.E.2d at 492.
149. Cannon, 112 Ill. 2d at 556, 494 N.E.2d at 492.
150. Id. at 553, 556, 494 N.E.2d at 491-92.
151. Id. at 556, 494 N.E.2d at 492.
152. Id.
153. 138 I11. App. 3d 13, 485 N.E.2d 504 (3rd Dist. 1985).
154. Id. at 14-15, 485 N.E.2d at 505.
155. Id. at 14, 485 N.E.2d at 504.
156. Id. In the original action, the trial court found the portion of the agreement
pertaining to the division of property controlling only as to property acquired by the
parties prior to the marriage. Thus, the property acquired during the marriage was divided by the trial court outside the scope of the agreement. Id. at 14, 485 N.E.2d at 505.
The trial court denied maintenance based on this division of marital property. Id. On an
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The appellate court overturned the award of maintenance because the trial court failed to consider the particular necessity for
such an award.15 7 Narrowly restricting the enforcement of the
agreement to the circumstances of Burgess,158 the appellate court
emphasized that Illinois courts are to mitigate the potential harm
to spouses that could result from strict enforcement of waiver of
maintenance provisions in antenuptial agreements.15 9 Thus, an
otherwise valid waiver of maintenance could be disregarded by the
court upon the occurrence of uncontemplated events more significant than a mere change in economic fortune. 1 "
V.

CHILD SUPPORT

The IMDMA provides for original awards of child support
under section 505.161

Child support modifications generally are

governed by section 510.162
A.

Statutory Minimum Support Guidelines

During the Survey year, the Illinois appellate courts addressed
significant questions in the area of child support involving the
mandatory minimum child support guidelines of section 505(a) of
the IMDMA. 163 The Illinois Appellate Court for the First Disappeal of the first award made by the trial court, the appellate court reversed the trial
court's original property division and remanded for further consideration of the maintenance issue based on the proper property division. In re Marriage of Burgess, 123 Ill.
App. 3d 487, 462 N.E.2d 203 (3rd Dist. 1984).
157. 138 Ill. App. 3d at 15, 485 N.E.2d at 505.
158. Id.
159. Id. The purpose of the IMDMA, in part, is to mitigate the potential harm to
spouses and their children caused by dissolution. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 102(4)
(1985). See Eule v. Eule, 24 Ill. App. 3d 83, 320 N.E.2d 506 (1st Dist. 1974) (courts
should uphold the validity of clauses in an antenuptial agreement when they are fair and
reasonable).
160. Burgess, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 15, 485 N.E.2d at 505. For example, a waiver of
maintenance could be avoided if its enforcement would render the spouse a public charge.
Such a condition might arise because of a lack of property resources, a lack of employability, a debilitating illness, or a mental or physical handicap. Id.
161. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 505 (1985). Section 505 provides in part: "In a
proceeding for dissolution of marriage,. . . the court may order either or both parents
owing a duty of support to a child of the marriage to pay an amount reasonable and
necessary for his support .. " Id.
162. Id. at para. 510.
163. See infra notes 164-94 and accompanying text. The court in In re Marriage of
Blaisdell, 142 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 492 N.E.2d 622 (1st Dist. 1986), considered the 1984
version of the mandatory minimum child support guidelines. Id. at 1035-36, 492 N.E.2d
at 623. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 505 (Supp. 1984) provided:
(a) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, declaration of invalidity of marriage, a proceeding for child support following dissolution of the marriage by a
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trict, in In re Marriage of Blaisdell,I" upheld the constitutionality
of the statutory guidelines against claims that the statutory guidelines violated substantive and procedural due process and equal
protection clauses and prohibitions against enactment of special
legislation. 165
In Blaisdell, the custodial parent brought an action to obtain 66
a
modification of child support under section 510 of the IMDMA.'
The trial court found the petitioner had shown a substantial
change in circumstances, 67 and thus modified the support order
pursuant to the guidelines established by section 505 of the
68
IMDMA.

On appeal, the respondent challenged the constitutionality of the
court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse or any proceeding authorized under Section 601 of this Act, the court may order either or both parents owing
a duty of support to a child of the marriage to pay an amount reasonable and necessary
for his support, without regard to marital misconduct, after considering all relevant factors, including:
(1) the financial resources of the child;
(2) the financial resources and needs of the custodial parent;
(3) the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not
been dissolved;
(4) the physical and emotional condition of the child, and his educational
needs; and
(5) the financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent or parents.
In cases involving child support alone, the Court shall determine the minimum amount
of support by using the following guidelines:
Number of Children
Percent of Income (Net)
1
20%
2
25%
3
32%
4
40%
5
45%
6 or more
50%
Id. This section of the challenged statute was amended in 1985, emphasizing the discretion vested in the court. See infra notes 458-75 and accompanying text. This amended
version, however, was not at issue before the court on this appeal. Blaisdell, 142 Ill. App.
3d at 1041, 492 N.E.2d at 627.
164. 142 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 492 N.E.2d 622.
165. Id. at 1042-48, 492 N.E.2d at 627-31.
166. Id. at 1035, 492 N.E.2d at 623.
167. Id. at 1036, 492 N.E.2d at 624. The petitioner's motion alleged that the child's
needs had increased since the 1979 dissolution judgment, attributable to higher expenses
for school tuition, camp, child care, and counseling. The motion also alleged that the
respondent's income had increased. The trial court found the petitioner had sustained
her burden of showing a substantial change in circumstances, justifying a modification of
the 1979 order. Id.
168. Id. at 1036-37, 492 N.E.2d at 624. The respondent's net monthly income was
approximately $2000. Following the statutory formula, the respondent was ordered to
pay $400 per month, increased from $275 per month. Id. at 1037, 492 N.E.2d at 624.
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guidelines,' 69 contending that the statute violated both the Illinois
Constitution's separation of powers requirement 7 ° and its prohibition against enactment of special legislation. '7' The respondent also
72
argued that the statute deprived him of procedural due process
and equal protection under both the state and federal constitutions. 173 He also alleged that the statute violated his substantive
due process rights protected by the federal constitution. 74 In making his constitutional challenges, the respondent assumed that the
to follow the statutory guidelines without
courts were mandated
75
any deviation.
In upholding the constitutionality of the minimum child support
guidelines, the appellate court noted that the legislative history indicated that the standards should not be rigidly applied. 76 The
court stated that rigid statutory application would reduce the
court's role to that of merely applying the mathematical formula
and calculating the correct amount of support. 77 Instead, the
court regarded the statutory guidelines as a starting point for anal169. Id. at 1036, 492 N.E.2d at 623.
170. Id. at 1042, 492 N.E.2d at 627; ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1; id. at art. IV, § 1. The
respondent argued that the separation of powers requirement was violated because the
trial court has no discretion to also consider the five relevant factors in the statute in
determining the level of child support payments. Blaisdell, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 1042, 492
N.E.2d at 627.
171. Id. at 1043, 492 N.E.2d at 627-28; ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13. The respondent
contended that the statute conferred a special benefit or exclusive privilege on a person or
group of persons to the exclusion of others similarly situated. Blaisdell, 142 Ill. App. 3d
at 1043, 492 N.E.2d at 628.
172. Id. at 1044-45, 492 N.E.2d at 628-29. The respondent relied on the decision in
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), to support the contention that the statute depriving him of property created an irrebutable presumption violating his rights to procedural
due process. Id.
173. Blaisdell, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 1046, 492 N.E.2d at 630. The respondent argued
that while the statute was neutral on its face, it unfairly discriminated against men in
favor of women in its application because men are the noncustodial parents in 88% of
divorce cases. Id. The court noted that the respondent's additional claim that the statute
deprived him of the constitutional provision mandating a remedy for every injury was
disposed of with the dismissal of the due process claim. Id. at 1048, 492 N.E.2d at 631
(citing ILL. CONST. art. II, § 19).
174. Blaisdell, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 1046, 492 N.E.2d at 629-30. The respondent argued that a noncustodial parent has a right not to support his or her children beyond the
provision of basic necessitites, regardless of the noncustodial parent's financial ability. Id.
175. Id. at 1038, 492 N.E.2d at 625.
176. Id. at 1040, 492 N.E.2d at 626. As quoted with favor by the court, the House
Debates on the date of passage indicated that the statutory percentages "really
are ... guidelines that can be changed up or down, but at least it's a set of statutory
guidelines, and you have to have a reason for coming in below those guidelines." Id.
(citing House Debates, H.B. 3068, 83d Gen. Assem., May 17, 1984, at 194, 195).
177. Blaisdell, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 1038, 492 N.E.2d at 625.
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ysis by the trial courts. 178 The parent who desires to modify the
child support above or below the percentages specified by the
guidelines has the burden of convincing the court to deviate from
those guidelines. 179 The Blaisdell court cautioned, however, that a
complete analysis includes proper consideration of all relevant factors dictated by Illinois law, such as need, ability to pay, and the
standard of living the0 child would have enjoyed if the marriage had
not been dissolved. 18
Traditionally, Illinois courts required a showing of an increased
need by the children and a corresponding increased ability to pay
by the noncustodial parent in order for a support judgment to be
modified. 181 In recent years the courts have taken a more lenient
approach,' 82 recognizing that the needs of the child and the financial circumstances of the noncustodial parent are not determinative, but merely factors to be taken into consideration. 8 3 Courts
also may refer to sections 502,184 506,185 and 513186 of the
IMDMA, and the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act. 187
178. Id. at 1040, 492 N.E.2d at 626.
179. Id. at 1041, 492 N.E.2d at 627.
180. Id. at 1040, 492 N.E.2d at 626. IMDMA section 505(a)(2) reads in pertinent
part:
(2)... Relevant factors may include but are not limited to:
(a) the financial resources of the child;
(b) the financial resources and needs of the custodial parent;
(c) the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not
been dissolved;
(d) the physical and emotional condition of the child, and his education
needs; and
(e) the financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 505(a)(2) (1985).
181. See Kelleher v. Kelleher, 67 Ill. App. 2d 410, 414, 214 N.E.2d 139, 141 (3rd
Dist. 1966).
182. See, e.g., Legan v. Legan, 69 Ill. App. 3d 304, 307, 387 N.E.2d 413, 415 (3rd
Dist. 1979) (child support payments may be increased when there has been an increase in
the noncustodial parent's ability to pay without a corresponding increase in the child's
needs); In re Support of Sharp, 65 Ill. App. 3d 945, 949, 382 N.E.2d 1279, 1282-83 (3rd
Dist. 1978) ("[c]hild support payments must necessarily reflect a balance of the intensity
of the child's needs with the ability of the parents to provide for that need").
183. See In re Marriage of Daniels, 115 Ill. App. 3d 173, 450 N.E.2d 361 (5th Dist.
1983); Giamanco v. Giamanco, 111 111. App. 3d 1017, 444 N.E.2d 1090 (5th Dist. 1982);
In re Marriage of Raidbard, 87 Ill. App. 3d 158, 408 N.E.2d 1021 (1st Dist. 1980).
184. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 502 (1985) (providing the courts with standards
for giving effect to agreements between the parties as relating to child support).
185. Id. at para. 506 (allowing the court to appoint an attorney to represent a minor
child's interests in a support action).
186. Id. at para. 513 (controlling support for non-minor children and educational
expenses).
187. Id. at para. 1201-1234.
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In In re Marriageof Erickson,"'8 the Illinois Appellate Court for
the Second District held the minimum statutory guidelines applicable to modification proceedings. 89 Following her remarriage, the
petitioner in Erickson contended that the trial court erred by failing to examine the amended IMDMA section 505(a) guidelines
prior to reducing the amount of child support. 190 The respondent
argued that section 505(a) was irrelevant, and that section 510191
was the only applicable statutory provision in a modification
award. 192
Rejecting the respondent's arguments, the appellate court confirmed previous holdings that trial courts must consider the same
factors in modifying the amount of child support as they consider
in formulating an original support order. 193 The Erickson court
concluded that those factors were found in section 505(a), and by
implication should be applied to modification proceedings under
section 510.19
Despite the number of decisions in the area of minimum statutory child support guidelines, many important questions remain
unanswered. For example, it is unsettled whether the guidelines
apply where modification is sought in cases decided prior to 1984.
If these guidelines are applicable to pre-1984 cases, it is unclear
what threshold of proof is required before the parties may seek
modification. There also is a question regarding whether parties
will be permitted to apply for modifications when prior support
orders do not meet the statutory minimums, but where there has
been no substantial change in circumstances since the original
award. While legislation providing that enactment of the minimum statutory guidelines constitutes an automatic change in circumstances has been proposed, it is no longer pending. The
imposition of mandatory guidelines after negotiation of a settle188. 136 Il1.App. 3d 907, 483 N.E.2d 692 (2nd Dist. 1985).
189. Id. at 912, 483 N.E.2d at 696.
190. Id. at 918, 483 N.E.2d at 700; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 505(a) (1985). See
infra notes 461-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative changes during the Survey year.
191. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 510 (1985). Section 510 provides inter alia:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (f) of Section 502, the provisions
of any judgment respecting maintenance or support may be modified only as to
installments accruing subsequent to the filing of the motion for modification
with due notice by the moving party and only upon a showing of substantial
change in circumstances.
Id. (emphasis added).
192. Erickson, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 918, 483 N.E.2d at 701.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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ment may thwart the parties' intention when they have exchanged
property or made other agreements which deviate from the
mandatory minimum amounts of child support.
In this era of two income families, an important issue is unresolved and unaddressed by the statute. The statute does not provide a method to apply the guidelines when both parties have
income. The statute's silence on this issue leaves available several
alternatives. For example, perhaps the trial court would just look
at the larger of the incomes and then apply the guidelines. Or, the
child's expenses could be met by each party in proportion to their
net income. Additional interpretation of the guidelines is sorely
needed.
B.

Educational and Post Majority Support

Child support obligations are terminated when the child has
reached the age of eighteen or been emancipated.195 However, section 513 of the IMDMA 196 provides an exception, authorizing the
courts to award support for disabled children even after they have
reached the age of majority. 197 This section also establishes the
parental obligation to provide for the educational expenses of their
children regardless of the children's ages.' gs
In In re Marriage of Bates,'99 the Illinois Appellate Court for
the Second District departed from previous decisions denying support for emancipated children. °° The Bates court held that section
195. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 510(c) (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110/2, para.
11-1 (1985) (the age of majority in Illinois is eighteen). A child may become emancipated
by marriage, People ex rel Mitts v. Ham, 206 Ill. App. 543 (3rd Dist. 1917), by entering
the armed forces, Iroquois Iron Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 294 Ill. 106, 128 N.E. 289
(1920), or by becoming economically self-sufficient, unless the self-sufficiency results from
a parent's failure to meet his child support obligations. Shuff v. Fulte, 344 Ill. App. 157,
100 N.E.2d 502 (3rd Dist. 1951).
196. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 513 (1985).
197. Id. Section 513 provides:
The Court also may make such provision for the education and maintenance of
the child or children, whether of minor or majority age, out of the property and
income of either or both of its parents as equity may require ....
In making
such awards, the court shall consider all relevant factors which shall appear
reasonable and necessary, including:
(a) The financial resources of both parents.
(b) The standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not
been dissolved.
(c) The financial resources of the child.
Id.
198. Id.
199. 141 Ill. App. 3d 566, 490 N.E.2d 1014 (2nd Dist. 1986).
200. See Finley v. Finley, 81 111. 2d 317, 410 N.E.2d 12 (1980) (unless otherwise
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513 includes the obligation to support children who have attained
or exceeded majority while they are attending school.2° ' In contesting the trial court's order requiring him to pay the medical expenses of the non-minor children while they were attending
school, 202 the father in Bates relied upon the earlier decision of In
re Marriageof Moore,2"3 which overturned an order requiring the

supporting parent to pay the medical and dental expenses of all of
the children until they reached the age of twenty-two.
The Bates court interpreted section 513 as authorizing a court to
provide for the education and maintenance of the child. 2° The
court distinguished Moore, noting that the order in that case did
not require that the non-minor attend school for the father to remain obligated, as did the Bates order.2 0 5 The court reasoned that
because the reasonable living expenses of the child may include
medical expenses, a parent may be required to pay his child's medical expenses while the child attends college, regardless of the
child's age.20 6 With respect to educational expenses, a divorced
parent has substantially greater finanical obligations than a parent
of a child in an intact marriage.
Section 513(b) provides that in fashioning a child support order,
a court must consider the "standard of living" the child would
have enjoyed if the parents were not divorced.20 7 In In re Support
agreed or provided in decree, child support obligations terminate upon emancipation of
child); In re Marriage of Moore, 117 Ill. App. 3d 206, 453 N.E.2d 102 (5th Dist. 1983)
(father not required to pay the medical and dental expenses of the children after they
reach the age of majority); In re Marriage of Thompson, 79 Ill. App. 3d 310, 398 N.E.2d
17 (1st Dist. 1979) (error to order further support for a child who had reached his majority and was not disabled);In re Marriage of Raski, 64 Ill. App. 3d 629, 381 N.E.2d 744
(5th Dist. 1978) (IMDMA provisions pertaining to child support do not extend parental
obligations past the age of minority except in limited situations); Kreitner v. Kreitner,
285 Ill. App. 602, 2 N.E.2d 569 (4th Dist. 1936) (father not liable for support and maintenance of his adult daughter who was mentally and physically sound and healthy).
201. Bates, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 574, 490 N.E.2d at 1019.
202. Id. at 573, 490 N.E.2d at 1018.
203. 117 Ill. App. 3d 206, 453 N.E.2d 102 (5th Dist. 1983).
204. 141 Ill. App. 3d at 574, 490 N.E.2d at 1019 (emphasis in original). See also In re
Marriage of Marg, Nos. 84-3066, 85-1086 (1st Dist. Oct. 7, 1985) (the requirement for
payment to the custodial parent for the living expenses of a child while attending college
locally was proper); In re Marriage of Pauley, 104 Ill. App. 3d 100, 432 N.E.2d 661 (4th
Dist. 1982) (father ordered to reimburse the mother for reasonable living expenses for
children attending college, whether living on campus or with mother).
205. Bates, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 573-74, 490 N.E.2d at 1018-19.
206. Id. at 574, 490 N.E.2d at 1019. It should be noted that the trial court order was
applicable to the periods when the children were attending "school" and while the appellate court affirmed this order as written, the opinion later qualified the language as "college." Id.
207. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 513(b) (1985).
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of Pearson, 208 the Illinois Supreme Court held that this section
allows courts to consider the amounts spent for the college education of the other children of the parties prior to the dissolution
when determining how much a divorced parent should be ordered
to pay for a child's education. 20 9 The availability of alternative educational programs, such as a public institution, was also recognized by the court as a relevant factor in this determination. 210
C. Modifications
During the Survey year, the supreme court held that a child is
not limited to support in the amount of his actual needs while the
noncustodial parent enjoys a much higher standard of living than
the child in In re MarriageofBussey.2 In that case, the trial court
permitted an increase in child support because the noncustodial
parent had the ability to pay in excess of and regardless of the
stated needs of the child.21 2 On appeal, the husband objected to
this increase, contending that the trial court erred in failing to
equate the "present combined ordinary expenses" of the children
with their demonstrated needs. 213 The supreme court disagreed,
relying on the trial court's order, which stated that the "present
combined ordinary expenses" failed to reflect the standard of living
to which the children were entitled.2 14 The Bussey court held that
present ordinary expenses do not set a limit on the noncustodial
parent's support obligation when that parent is enjoying a decidedly higher standard of living than the child.21 5
While acknowledging that the child's financial needs are the
most important consideration when modifying a support award,21 6
the Illinois Appellate Court for the Third District held that the
available means of the parties also should be considered in a modification proceeding. 217 In Ingwerson v. Woeckener,218 the court reasoned that in a modification proceeding predicated upon the
208. 111 Ill. 2d 539, 490 N.E.2d 1274 (1986).
209. Id. at 551, 490 N.E.2d at 1277.
210. Id. at 551-52, 490 N.E.2d at 1277.
211. 108 Ill. 2d 286, 297, 483 N.E.2d 1229, 1234 (1986). For a discussion of the
jurisdictional issues raised in Bussey, see infra notes 238-47 and accompanying text.
212. Bussey, 108 Ill. 2d at 296, 483 N.E.2d at 1233.
213. Id. at 297, 483 N.E.2d at 1234.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 297-98, 483 N.E.2d at 1234.
216. Ingwerson v. Woeckener, 141 Ill. App. 3d 647, 649, 490 N.E.2d 1008, 1010 (3rd
Dist. 1986).
217. Id. at 649, 490 N.E.2d at 1009.
218. Id. at 647, 490 N.E.2d 1008.
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increased needs of the child, the judge must evaluate the financial
position of the non-supporting parent.2" 9 The obligation of the
supporting parent should correspondingly increase or decrease depending upon this evaluation.220 Thus, the Ingwerson court held
that, when making a modification order, trial courts must determine which party is better able to meet the increased needs of the
child. 22 After Ingwerson, a non-custodial supporting parent can
bring an action for modification based on a change in the custodial
parent's ability to pay.
Section 510 of the IMDMA provides that all modifications of
child suppport are prospective only. 222 In Nerini v. Nerini,223 the
Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District held that a retroactive modification of child support was precluded when the divorce
decree awarded no child support but retained jurisdiction to enter
orders for future support.224 In Nerini, the mother was awarded
custody of the child pursuant to a 1964 dissolution order.22 The
trial court, however, did not make an award of child support, but
expressly retained jurisdiction for the purpose of entering future
maintenance and child support orders.226 Twenty years later, the
plaintiff sought retroactive child support, dating from the child's
birth in 1963, as well as a portion of the child's college expenses.227
On appeal, the defendant contended that IMDMA section
510(a) 221 governed the petition, and thus barred an award of retroactive child support. 229 The plaintiff, however, claimed that this
219. Id. at 649, 490 N.E.2d at 1010. While both parents share an equal duty to
support their children, the courts consider the income and assets of both parents when
setting the amount awarded. In re Marriage of Riordan, 47 Ill. App. 3d 1019, 1023, 365
N.E.2d 492, 497 (1st Dist. 1977). Therefore, the parent less able to bear the financial
burden of supporting the child generally is considered the non-supporting parent.
220. Ingwerson, 141 111. App. 3d at 649-50, 490 N.E.2d at 1010.
221. Id.
222. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 510(a) (1985). Section 510(a) provides in part
that "the provisions of any judgment respecting maintenance or support may be modified
only as to installments accruing subsequent to the filing of the motion for modification
with due notice by the moving party and only upon a showing of a substantial change in
circumstances."
223. 140 Ill. App. 3d 848, 488 N.E.2d 1379 (2nd Dist. 1986).
224. Id. at 856, 488 N.E.2d at 1384.
225. Id. at 849, 488 N.E.2d at 1381.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See supra note 222.
229. Nerini, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 852-53, 488 N.E.2d at 1382. Specifically, the defendant relied upon that portion of the statute which states: "[T]he provisions of any judgment respecting maintenance or support may be modified only as to installments accruing
subsequent to the filing of the motion for modification .. " ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para.
510(a) (1985).
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section did not apply because she was not seeking a modification;
the 1964 judgment contained no order awarding child support, so
there was no order for the court to modify.230 The appellate court,
however, concluded that the trial court's order not requiring child
support payments in effect created an order which could only be
modified in compliance with section 510.23" 1
Generally, dating the retroactivity of child support modifications
back to the time of the filing of a petition is within the discretion of
the trial court.232 The Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District recently held that modifications of unallocated maintenance
and child support may be awarded retroactively in In re Marriage
of Ingrassia.233 In that case, the trial court modified the original
unallocated maintenance and child support award, and also issued
an oral order applying the increase retroactively to the date of the
petition seeking modification. 234 Before the order was drawn, the
trial judge allowed reconsideration, reducing the award by fifty
dollars a month and changing the retroactive date by nearly two
years. 23 Because of the source of the evidence presented by the
petitioner, as well as the fact that she had filed a bankruptcy petition, the appellate court found the trial court had not abused its
discretion in ordering the modification.236
D.

Jurisdiction

In Illinois, in any post-judgment proceeding to enforce or modify the judgment of another state, the foreign judgment must first
230. Nerini, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 853, 488 N.E.2d at 1382-83.
231. Id. at 853-54, 488 N.E.2d at 1383. Under the express provisions of section 510,
modification of an existing order for child support can only be had as to installments
accruing after the filing of the modification petition. At the time of the filing in this case,
the child had already reached the age of majority, so no award of child support could be
made. Id. at 854, 488 N.E.2d at 1383.
232. In re Marriage of Ingrassia, 140 11. App. 3d 826, 832, 489 N.E.2d 386, 390 (2nd
Dist. 1986) (citing In re Marriage of Roth, 99 Ill. App. 3d 679, 687, 426 N.E.2d 246, 249
(1st Dist. 1981)).
233. Ingrassia, 140 I11.App. 3d at 832, 489 N.E.2d at 390.
234. Id. at 827, 830, 489 N.E.2d at 387, 389.
235. Id. at 830, 489 N.E.2d at 389. The trial court heard the modification petition on
February 23, 1984. The oral order was entered March 15, 1984, at which time the judge
requested the petitioner to draw up the order. At the hearing on the respondent's motion
to reconsider, the trial judge again asked the petitioner to draw up the order. The petitioner never did so. On April 30, 1984, the judge submitted a letter opinion allowing
reconsideration, reducing the unallocated child support and directing the respondent to
draft such an order. Id.
236. Id. at 832, 489 N.E.2d at 390. Part of the financial evidence presented by the
petitioner was based on past due debts. Additionally, her 1982 budget, received into evidence, was based on her 1984 budget. Id.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 18

be enrolled under section 511 of the IMDMA.237 In In re Marriage
of Bussey,238 the Illinois Supreme Court held that a foreign judgment is properly enrolled in Illinois when a certified copy of the
judgment is attached to a petition seeking its modification.239 The
parties were divorced in Indiana. The Indiana decree awarded custody of the children to the mother. 2 1 Approximately four years
later, the father took physical custody of the children, and in 1981
filed a petition in Illinois requesting that the Indiana custody
award be modified to give him custody. 24 ' This petition referred
to the Indiana divorce decree and included a certified copy of that
decree.242 The father's petition was denied, and a few months later
the mother filed her own petition requesting an increase in child
support.243 The father then contended that the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to modify the Indiana decree because it
was not properly enrolled in Illinois. 24
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the language of IMDMA
section 511 indicates that only one petition is required in order to
commence a proceeding to modify a judgment. 245 Because a party
is not required to file one petition to enroll the foreign judgment
and another to modify the same judgment,246 the father's original
petition to change custody was held sufficient to constitute a "petition to enroll" the judgment, as contemplated by the statute.247
During the Survey period, the Illinois Supreme Court extended
the boundaries of the jurisdiction of the Illinois courts. In In re
Marriageof Highsmith,248 the court held that a father's sending of
his child to Illinois, and his failure to fulfill his obligation of child
support, constituted a tortious act within the meaning of the Code
of Civil Procedure. 249 Following these actions by the father, the
mother filed a petition for rule to show cause in Illinois, alleging an
237. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 511 (1985).
238. 108 Ill. 2d 286, 292-93, 483 N.E.2d 1229 (1985). For a discussion of the modification of child support issues in Bussey, see supra notes 211-15 and accompanying text.
239. Bussey, 108 Ill. 2d at 292-93, 483 N.E.2d at 1232.
240. Id. at 290, 483 N.E.2d at 1230.
241. Id. at 290, 483 N.E.2d at 1231.
242. Id. The father's petition included a certified copy of the Indiana decree sworn to
be true and correct, as required by the statute. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 511(c)
(1985).
243. Bussey, 108 Ill. 2d at 291, 483 N.E.2d at 1231.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 292, 483 N.E.2d at 1231-32.
246. Id. at 292, 483 N.E.2d at 1232.
247. Id. at 293, 483 N.E.2d at 1232.
248. 111 111. 2d 69, 488 N.E.2d 1000 (1986).
249. Id. at 74, 488 N.E.2d at 1003.
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arrearage in child support.2"' The father contended that the court
lacked personal jurisdiction over him. 51 The court found that the
father's removal of the child to Illinois, without obtaining either a
modification of custody or of the child support award, constituted
a tortious act sufficient to subject the father to the jurisdiction of
the Illinois court.252 Therefore, the father's actions satisfied the requirements of due process, making him amenable to the court's
jurisdiction in custody and support proceedings. 3
The court concentrated on the father's act of sending the child to
Illinois, yet stretched the long-arm jurisdiction of the court based
upon his failure to support the child. Though it is undetermined
whether different facts would warrant the same finding, the Highsmith case must be considered when one is attempting to assert
jurisdiction for a child support award.
E.

Enforcement of Child Support Awards

Past due installments of child support are the vested right of the
designated recipient and may not be reduced by the court either as
to the amount or time of payment.254 Current child support
awards or awards in arrearage, however, may be modified by
agreement between the parties. 2" Courts also may consider the
defense of equitable estoppel in reducing the amount of child support arrearages.25 6
In Elliott v. Elliott,257 the mother filed a petition for rule to show
cause based on child support arrearages. 25 1 The father alleged that
he had entered into an oral agreement with the mother to reduce
the amount of his child support obligations, and therefore he had
reduced the payments accordingly.25 9 The lack of proof regarding
an agreement between the parties reducing the child support payments convinced the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District that such an agreement did not exist. 26 0 The court also
250. Id. at 71, 488 N.E.2d at 1002.
251. Id. For further discussion of the procedural aspects of Highsmith, see the Survey article entitled Civil Procedure.
252. Highsmith, 111 111. 2d at 74, 488 N.E.2d at 1003.
253. Id. at 76, 488 N.E.2d at 1004.
254. Elliott v. Elliott, 137 Ill. App. 3d 277, 278-79, 484 N.E.2d 482, 483 (4th Dist.
1985).
255. Id. at 279, 484 N.E.2d at 483-84.
256. Hoos v. Hoos, 86 11. App. 3d 817, 408 N.E.2d 752 (1st Dist. 1980).
257. 137 Ill. App. 3d 277, 484 N.E.2d 482 (4th Dist. 1985).
258. Id. at 277-78, 484 N.E.2d at 483.
259. Id. at 278, 484 N.E.2d at 483.
260. Id. at 279, 484 N.E.2d at 484.
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determined that the mother's silence with respect to the husband's
unilateral reduction and the passage of over five years did not create a defense of equitable estoppel on behalf of the father.261
Therefore, the court held that the father's unilateral reduction of
child support payments was improper and the mother was entitled
to receive the full amount of unpaid child support.2 62
The difficulty in using the defense of equitable estoppel against
an arrearage claim also was demonstrated in Meirink v. Osborne.263
In that case, the father sought to invoke the doctrine of equitable
estoppel against a child support arrearage claim of $ 2 4 ,6 0 0 .26 To

do so, the father had to show that he relied in good faith on the
voluntary conduct of the mother and suffered a detriment as a result.2 65 Although the assessment of an accumulated arrearage

would presumably affect the father's lifestyle, the court refused to
find this a detrimental change justifying relief.266 Thus, the
Meirink court denied the father's equitable estoppel claim.267
In Reagan v. Baird,268 the Illinois Appellate Court for the
Fourth District held the plaintiff was not required to obtain a judgment, or even initiate legal action, with respect to a claim for past
due child support in order to challenge a conveyance between family members allegedly intended to frustrate collection of the support payments.269 Because obligations arising out of the marital
relationship have been held to be of the same class as obligations to
"creditors" or "other persons",27 ° the Reagan court held that an
allegation of a child support arrearage is sufficient to provide protection under the fraudulent conveyance statute.27 '
Illinois has adopted the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act (the "Act" or "URESA"). 2 2 The Act was designed
to facilitate enforcement of support duties 273 and compel support of
dependents by obligated parties both within and outside of Illi261. Id.
262. Id. at 279, 484 N.E.2d at 484.
263. No. 84-0117 (5th Dist. Aug. 15, 1985).
264. Id. at 3.
265. Id. at 4.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 5.
268. 140 Ill. App. 3d 58, 487 N.E.2d 1028 (4th Dist. 1985).
269. Id. at 59, 65, 487 N.E.2d at 1030, 1034.
270. Id. at 65, 487 N.E.2d at 1034.
271. Id. The fraudulent conveyance statute is found at ILL. REV.
4 (1985).
272. ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, paras. 1201-1242 (1985).
273. Id. at para. 1201.

STAT.

ch. 59, para.

1986]

Family Law

nois.274 In Gribbins v. Skoptiz, 275 the Illinois Appellate Court for
the Fifth District held that a URESA action is a separate and independent action to enforce support obligations.276
In Gribbins, the father's obligations had been retroactively terminated under an Indiana court order.27 7 The mother counterclaimed in Illinois in an attempt to recoup the amount terminated
by the Indiana court. 27 The Illinois court upheld the dismissal of
the mother's claim, finding that Illinois should not redetermine a
duty of support already established by a sister state unless special
circumstances exist. 279 The Gribbins court recognized that the Act
merely creates the means by which a duty of support existing
under the law of another state may be enforced. 280 The court thus
concluded that a URESA proceeding is an inappropriate action for
seeking relief from an objectionable judgment. 281 Rather, relief
should be sought through the appeals process or through a modification of that judgment.282 The Gribbins decision is consistent
with other decisions of the Survey period curtailing forum shopping by the parties.2 a3
Once an arrearage of child support payments is established, the
court may hold an obligated party in contempt, as did the trial
court in In re Marriage of Lueck.2 s4 It appears, however, that
some contempt proceedings will be stayed under the automatic
stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.28 5 In Lueck, the father,
having been found in contempt for failing to pay child support, was
sentenced to serve thirty days in jail, unless the contempt was
274. See People ex rel Noah v. Gasik, 91 Ill. App. 3d 980, 415 N.E.2d 452 (1st Dist.
1980).
275. 135 Ill. App. 3d 76, 481 N.E.2d 815 (5th Dist. 1985).
276. Id. at 78, 481 N.E.2d at 817. The remedies provided by the statute are "in
addition to and not in substitution for any other remedies." Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 40, para. 1203 (1985)).
277. Gribbins, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 78, 481 N.E. 2d at 817.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 79, 481 N.E.2d at 817.
280. Id. at 78, 481 N.E.2d at 817.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. See infra notes 33745.
284. 140 Ill. App. 3d 836, 837, 489 N.E.2d 443, 444 (2nd Dist. 1986).
285. Id. The pertinent provisions of the Bankruptcy Act provide:
[A] petition filed under . . . this title . . . operates as a stay, applicable to all
entities, of
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding
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purged by his payment of the arrearage. 8 6 Subsequently, the father filed a voluntary chapter 13 petition in bankruptcy" 7 and requested the trial court to stay all proceedings, including the jail
sentence, until either the completion or dismissal of his bankruptcy
petition.288
The issue before the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District was whether the sentence for contempt invoked the automatic
stay of section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code289 or whether it fell
within the exceptions under section 362(b) of that Code.29° Under
normal circumstances, the stay of contempt proceedings predicated upon a failure to pay a judgment will serve to protect a
debtor.2 9 When the contempt is imposed in order to uphold the
automatic stay prodignity and integrity of the court, however, the292
visions of the Bankruptcy Act will not apply.
Weighing the competing considerations of the Bankruptcy Code
and the contempt powers of the court, the Lueck court determined
that the contempt order was a sanction to compel payment of the
past due child support from the estate of the bankrupt father,
rather than a means to uphold the dignity of the court. 293 Accordingly, the father's filing of the bankruptcy petition served to stay
the jail sentence imposed on him by the court.294
VI.

CUSTODY

A. Joint Custody
Perhaps the most significant custody issue addressed during the
against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this
title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a
judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from
the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate ....
II U.S.C. § 362(a) (Supp. IIl 1985).
286. Lueck, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 837, 489 N.E.2d at 444.
287. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1982).
288. Lueck, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 837, 489 N.E.2d at 444.
289. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (Supp. III 1985); see supra note 285 for the pertinent portion
of the statute.
290. 11 U.S.C. at § 362(b) (Supp. III 1985). The Bankruptcy Act further provides
that the filing of an action under this title does not operate as a stay of "the collection of
alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not property of the estate.
Id.
291. Lueck, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 837, 489 N.E.2d at 444.
292. Id. at 837, 489 N.E.2d at 445.
293. Id. at 838, 489 N.E.2d at 445.
294. Id.
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Survey period was the interrelationship of joint custody and the
standards necessary for the removal of a child from the state. If
one feature of joint custody is a continued and frequent access to
the child by both parties, the question arises as to whether removal
from the state should be governed by the "best interest of the
child" standard. Or is the removal, in effect, a modification of custody which should be governed by the higher "serious endangerment to the child" standard, if brought within two years of the
original custody determination? In In re Marriage of Bednar,29
the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District held that when
both parents are granted custody, a removal petition filed by the
residential custodial parent will not be considered a petition for
modification of custody which requires a showing of endangerment
to the child.296
In Bednar, the parents were awarded joint custody of the
only child of the marriage.297 Subsequently, the father filed a petition to remove the child from the state, alleging that the removal
met the "best interest of the child" standard established by section
609 of the IMDMA. 298 The mother contended that, when custody
is held jointly by the parents, a petition for removal is tantamount
to a petition for modification of custody and therefore subject to
the stricter standards of scrutiny found under section 610 of the
IMDMA.299
Examining the applicable provisions of the IMDMA, 3° the
court held that a petition for removal should be subject to the same
analytical standards and in the same manner, as any other petition
regarding parental involvement. °1 While the IMDMA distinguishes between removal petitions and requests to modify cus295. 146 Ill. App. 3d 704, 496 N.E.2d 1149 (1st Dist. 1986).
296. Id. at 708, 496 N.E.2d at 1152.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 705, 707, 496 N.E.2d at 1150. The father based his petition on section 609
of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Act which states in part that "[the] court may
grant leave . . . to any party having custody of any minor child or children to remove
such child or children from Illinois whenever such approval is in the best interests of such
child or children." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 609 (1985).
299. Bednar, 146 Ill. App. 3d at 708, 496 N.E.2d at 1152. Section 610(a) states in
part that "no motion to modify a custody judgment may be made earlier than two years
after its date, unless the court. . . [has] reason to believe the child's present environment
may. . . endanger seriously his physical, mental, moral or emotional health." ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 40, para. 610(a) (1985).
300. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 601-611 (1985).
301. Bednar, 146 Ill. App. 3d at 711, 496 N.E.2d at 1154.
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tody,3 °2 the court could find no justification for applying the
IMDMA differently to joint and sole custody situations.3 °3 Thus,
the court held that a petition for removal should be evaluated
under the "best interest" standards of section 609. 3°
The argument may be made that removal is a de facto change of
joint custody, making joint custody impossible on a practical level.
Removal of a child from the state under a joint custody arrangement may, in practice, amount to a modification of the intended
arrangement of the parties. Nevertheless, the question of which
standards are to be used, when removal is sought under a joint
custody arrangement, has been resolved for now. While the test is
clear, allowing a removal under these circumstances could, in effect, defeat the purpose and advantages of joint custody.
B.

Standardsfor Modification of Custody

Several cases arising during the Survey period illustrate the type
of factors weighed by the courts when modifying custody orders.3 "5
Integration of the child into the family is such an evidentiary factor
302.

Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 609 (1985) (removals) with ILL. REV.
ch. 40, para. 610 (1985) (modifications).
303. Bednar, 146 Ill. App. 3d at 709, 496 N.E.2d at 1152.
304. Id. at 706, 496 N.E.2d at 1150. In upholding the contention that the "best interest" standards of section 609 apply to the granting of leave to remove a child from Illinois
where custody is held jointly, the court emphasized that removal may nevertheless fail to
meet even this less rigid standard. The court stated:
[T]he impact of removal upon the rights of the non-residential custodial parent
is a significant and important factor the trial court considers in its adjudication
of whether removal would be in the child's best interests. . . . [Wjhere removal
to a distant state will substantially alter the parent's involvement with the child,
it is for the trial court to examine the potential harm to the child which may
result.
Id. at 711, 496 N.E.2d at 1153. Thus, while a joint custodial parent may now seek to
remove a child from this jurisdiction, such a request will be given close judicial scrutiny.
Id. at 712, 496 N.E.2d at 1154. It is incumbent upon the petitioning parent to establish
that the removal, and the resulting reduction of maximum parental involvement, would
not interfere with the child's best interests. Id. at 711, 496 N.E.2d at 1154.
305. See, e.g., In re Custody of Sussenbach, 108 Ill. 2d 489, 485 N.E.2d 367 (1985);
Mullins v. Mullins, 142 Ill. App. 3d 57, 490 N.E.2d 1375 (1st Dist. 1986). In Sussenbach,
the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the trial court's examination of the custodial parent's
lifestyle and emphasized the broad discretion the trial court possesses in determining
whether to modify a custody order. Sussenbach, 108 Ill. 2d at 498, 500, 485 N.E.2d at
370, 371. In Mullins, the appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in changing custody to the father when the mother falsely accused the father of
sexual abuse of one of the children, used the stepfather's name for the children, and
denied the father's visitation rights. Mullins, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 58-59, 81, 490 N.E.2d at
1376, 1391.
STAT.
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recognized by the courts in a custody modification proceeding. 30 6
Prior to 1982, the Illinois courts held that a finding that the child
had been integrated into the petitioner's family with the custodial
parent's consent was necessary before a custody order could be
modified.307 In 1982, the Illinois legislature amended section
610(b) of the IMDMA 308 to provide that integration with consent
is only a factor for the court to consider, rather than a requirement
for modification of custody. 3° The Illinois Appellate Court for the
Second District, in In re Marriage of Stuckert,1 ° utilized this
amendment.
In Stuckert, following summer visitation with the father, the
child was allowed to remain, by agreement of the parties, because
the mother developed health problems. 31 1 The father petitioned for
a modification of custody in his favor.3 12 The trial court denied the
petition.31 3 The father argued that his physical custody of the child
for fifteen months and the child's display of happiness and adjustment should have been weighed more heavily in the father's favor
by the trial court.31 4 The court held that the mother's illness did
not create a consensual relinquishment of custody. 3 5 Therefore,
the integration of the child into the father's family was not a factor
36
subject to consideration in the custody modification proceeding.
C. Standing and Jurisdiction
Under section 601(b)(2) of the IMDMA, 317 a nonparent who is
306. Rippon v. Rippon, 64 Ill. App. 3d 465, 381 N.E.2d 70 (3rd Dist. 1978); Holloway v. Holloway, 10 Ill. App. 3d 662, 294 N.E.2d 759 (1st Dist. 1973).
307. In re Marriage of Wechselberger, 115 Ill. App. 3d 779, 785, 450 N.E.2d 1385,
1390 (2nd Dist. 1983) (citing In re Marriage of Pease, 106 Ill. App. 3d 617, 435 N.E.2d
1361 (2nd Dist. 1982)).
308. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 610(b)(1)-(3) (1981)),
309. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 610(b) (1985). See Wechselberger, 115 Ill. App.
3d at 787, 450 N.E.2d at 1390.
310. 138 Ill. App. 3d 788, 486 N.E.2d 395 (2nd Dist. 1985).
311. Id. at 790, 486 N.E.2d at 396.
312. Id. at 789, 486 N.E.2d at 396.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 791-92, 486 N.E.2d at 397.
315. Id. at 792, 486 N.E.2d at 397-98.
316. Id. at 792, 486 N.E.2d at 398.
317. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 601(b)(2) (1985). Section 601(b)(2) states in pertinent part:
(b) A child custody proceeding is commenced in the court:
(2) by a person other than a parent, by filing a petition for custody of the child
in the court in which he is permanently resident or found, but only if he is not in
the physical custody of one of his parents (emphasis added).
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petitioning for legal custody first must show that the child is not in
the physical custody of one of his parents. After making this
showing, the nonparent may proceed with the custody request
under the "best interest of the child" standards enunciated by the
IMDMA.318 The nonparent does not have to fulfill the standing
requirement of section 601 if he can show that the natural parents
are unfit.319 Mere actual physical possession of a child, however,
may not be enough to establish standing. In In re Custody of Peterson,32 ° the Illinois Supreme Court held that physical possession of a
child was insufficient to satisfy the standing requirement for
nonparents seeking
a custody modification under section 601(b)(2)
3 21
of the IMDMA.
In Peterson, the custodial mother and the child lived with the
maternal grandparents, and following the death of the mother, the
grandparents filed a petition for modification of the custody order.322 At the time of the filing, the child resided with the grandparents.323 The father contended that the grandparents did not
have standing to file the modification petition because custody of
the child passed to him after the mother died.324 The question
before the Illinois Supreme Court was whether the death of the
mother transferred physical custody from the mother to the grandparents in satisfaction of the standing requirement. 25
Though an issue of first impression for the supreme court, previous appellate court decisions had refused to recognize the actual
physical possession of a child as determinative of the standing
question.326 The Peterson court concluded that the appellate court
decisions had correctly interpreted the effect of actual physical cus318.

In re Custody of Peterson, 112 Ill. 2d 48, 53, 491 N.E.2d 1150, 1151 (1986); ILL.
ch. 40, para. 602 (1985).
319. Peterson, 112 Ill. 2d at 52, 491 N.E.2d at 1152 (citing the Juvenile Court Act,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, paras. 701-1 to 708-4 (1985)).
320. 112 111. 2d 48, 491 N.E.2d 1150.
321. Id. at 55, 491 N.E.2d at 1152 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 601(b)(2)
(1985)).
322. Peterson, 112 Ill. 2d at 50, 491 N.E.2d at 1151.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 53, 491 N.E.2d at 1153.
326. See In re Custody of Menconi, 117 Ill. App. 3d 394, 398, 453 N.E.2d 835, 838
(1st Dist. 1983) (grandparents had standing to petition for custody because the father had
voluntarily relinquished physical custody of the child and the child had lived with the
grandparents for an extended period of time); In re Custody of Barokas, 109 Ill. App. 3d
536, 541, 440 N.E.2d 1036, 1039 (1982) (third party did not satisfy the standing requirement because the mother had not relinquished custody of the child within the meaning of
the statute when child was placed by her mother in the temporary care of her adult sister
and later turned over to a third party).
REV. STAT.
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tody on the standing question. 327 The court stated that a contrary

conclusion would encourage abductions of minors for purposes of
satisfying the literal terms of the standing requirement and defeat
the statute's intent.328
The court found that mere physical possession does not establish
custody. 329 Analyzing the facts, the Peterson court concluded that
the mother never transferred physical custody to the grandparents
during her lifetime because she and the child had never been separated for a long period of time. 330 Furthermore, the father had

never relinquished custody because he exercised his visiting rights
and would never expect that the grandparents would have custody
merely because the child lived with the mother. 33 ' Therefore, the

grandparents' actual physical possession of the child did not provide them with standing under the "best interest of the child" standards of the IMDMA.332
333
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (the "UCCJA")
states that the Illinois courts have jurisdiction to make a child custody determination if Illinois is the home state of the child or if it
would be in the best interest of the child for the Illinois courts to
assume jurisdiction.334 If the court relies on the "best interests"
grounds, a showing must be made that the child and at least one
parent have significant contacts with the state. 335 The availability

of substantial evidence in Illinois concerning the child's present or
future care, protection, training, and personal relationships weigh
in favor of an Illinois court assuming jurisdiction under the
UCCJA.336
In In re Marriage of Rogers,3 3 7 the Illinois Appellate Court for
the Fifth District, facing a jurisdictional question under the
UCCJA, determined that the circuit court's exercise of jurisdiction
was a patent violation of the UCCJA.338 In Rogers, the marriage of
the parties was dissolved under a foreign judgment, with custody of
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

Peterson, 112 Ill. 2d at 53, 491 N.E.2d at 1152.
Id. at 54, 491 N.E.2d at 1153.
Id. at 55, 491 N.E.2d at 1153.
Id. at 54, 491 N.E.2d at 1153.
Id.
Id. at 55, 491 N.E.2d at 1153.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 2101-2126 (1986).
Id. at paras. 2104(a)(1)(2).
Id. at para. 2104(a)(2)(i).
Id. at para. 2104 (a)(2)(ii).
141 Ill. App. 3d 561, 490 N.E.2d 1000 (5th Dist. 1986).
Id. at 564, 490 N.E.2d at 1002.
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the minor child awarded to the father. 339 The mother moved to

Illinois and successfully filed a petition to register the judgment of
dissolution in Illinois.34 Subsequently, she filed a petition for a
rule to show cause, claiming her Christmas visitation rights had
been ignored by the father.3 4 The father objected to the court's
jurisdiction over the matter on the grounds that the UCCJA was
improperly
applied and that the Illinois court was an inconvenient
42
3

forum.

The Rogers court held the Illinois court did not have jurisdiction
because neither the child nor the father was ever an Illinois resident, as required by the UCCJA.343 The court also determined
that no evidence satisfied the jurisdictional requirements under the
"best interest of the child" standard accepted by the UCCJA. 3"
Because the custodial parent and the child lived in another state
under a foreign dissolution judgment, Illinois had no jurisdiction to
rule upon a custody modification petition filed by the non-custodial
parent residing in Illinois.345 In effect, the Rogers court has curtailed potential forum shopping by parents in custody cases.
D. Appealability
The appealability of final judgments that do not dispose of the
entire proceeding generally are governed by Supreme Court Rule
304.346 This rule provides that when multiple claims for relief are
involved in an action, an appeal may be taken from a final judgment concerning one or more of the claims only if the trial court
has made an express written finding that there is no just reason for
delaying enforcement or appeal.347 When an interlocutory order
affecting the care and custody of unemancipated minors is involved, however, a petition for leave to appeal is governed by
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 306.348 In 1983, the Illinois Supreme
339. Id. at 562, 490 N.E.2d at 1002.
340. Id. at 563, 490 N.E.2d at 1002.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 564, 490 N.E.2d at 1002.
344. Id. at 564, 490 N.E.2d at 1002-03.
345. Id. at 566, 490 N.E.2d at 1004.
346. ILL. S. CT. R. 304, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 304(a) (1985).
347. Id.
348. ILL. S. CT. R. 306, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 306(a)(1)(v) (1985). Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 306 states in part:
(1) An appeal may be taken in the following cases only on the allowance by the
Appellate Court of a petition for leave to appeal:
(v) from interlocutory orders affecting the care and custody of unemancipated
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Court, in In re Marriageof Leopando,3 4 9 held that a custody order

was not a separate claim in a dissolution proceeding and thus was
not final or appealable under Supreme Court Rule 306.350
During the Survey period, the Illinois Supreme Court, in In re
Marriage of Purdy,51 however, held a post-dissolution custody
modification order properly appealable under Rule 304.352 Following the dissolution of the parties' marriage, a modification of the
custody order was entered by the trial court changing custody
from the mother to the father.353 The trial court reserved ruling on
the issue of the mother's summer visitation which was to begin the
following summer.354
The mother appealed the trial court's custody modification order
under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a).3 55 The Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District dismissed the mother's appeal on
the ground that the trial court's order was not final or appealable,
based on the Leopando decision.356
The supreme court, in Purdy, concluded that the decision in Leopando was limited to orders issued in the context of dissolution
proceedings.357 The court reasoned that Leopando did not extend
to the custody modification order being appealed in Purdy because
the issue of custody arose as a post-dissolution proceeding, rather
than as a matter ancillary to the issue of the original dissolution.358
minors, if the appeal of such orders is not otherwise specifically provided for
elsewhere in these rules.
349. 96 Ill. 2d 114, 449 N.E.2d 137 (1983).
350. Id. at 120, 449 N.E.2d at 140. In Leopando, the trial court entered an order to
dissolve the parties' marriage, awarding permanent custody of the child to the defendent.
Id. at 116, 449 N.E.2d at 138. The statute requires an express written finding by the trial
court that there is no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
1 10A, para. 304(a) (1985) The order contained this necessary language and reserved for
future consideration the issues of maintenance, property division and attorney fees. Leopando, 96 Ill. 2d at 116, 449 N.E.2d at 138. The Leopando court reasoned that a petition
for dissolution presents a single claim and the other issues involved, such as custody,
child support, maintenance, or property division, are merely separate issues relating to
the same claim. Id. at 119, 449 N.E.2d at 140. The court found that to allow an appeal of
a custody order in a dissolution proceeding would encourage "piecemeal litigation" arising out of the same proceeding and discourage the courts from deciding matters incident
to the dissolution in a single judgment. Id. at 118, 120, 449 N.E.2d at 139, 140.
351. 112 Ill. 2d 1, 490 N.E.2d 1278 (1986).
352. Id. at 5, 490 N.E.2d at 1279-80.
353. Id. at 3, 490 N.E.2d at 1278. The modification order granted the mother reasonable visitation on alternating weekends and holidays. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 3, 490 N.E.2d at 1279.
356. Id. at 3, 490 N.E.2d at 1278-79.
357. Id. at 4, 490 N.E.2d at 1279.
358. Id. at 5, 490 N.E.2d at 1279. The court reasoned:
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Furthermore, the cause of action was a petition for change of custody, with all related issues, except for the mother's summer visitation, having been previously decided.359 Under Purdy, therefore,
custody modification orders will be considered final and appealable
when matters left for future determination are merely incidental to
the ultimate custody rights adjudicated by the decree. 3 °
VII.

DISSOLUTION

One major issue during the Survey period concerned a constitutional interpretation of the no-fault provision of the IMDMA. 61
The no-fault provision allows for a dissolution of marriage on the
basis of irreconcilable differences of the parties, leading to irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, when the parties have been living
separate and apart for a period in excess of two years. 362 The
courts also addressed the rights of wards and guardians to institute
dissolution proceedings.
A.

Constitutionalityof No-Fault Provision

In In re Marriageof Semmler,3 6 3 the Illinois Supreme Court held
that retroactive application of the no-fault provision of the
IMDMA 3 4 is constitutional.365 In Semmler, the husband, in comUnlike the situation in Leopando in which the cause of action was a petition for
dissolution of marriage and only the issue of custody had been decided, here the
cause of action is a petition for a change of custody and all related claims have
been decided except for the extent of the mother's summer visitation, a matter
that is always subject to revision. Thus, the kind of piecemeal litigation that the
decision in Leopando was intended to prevent cannot occur in this context.
Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. 146 Ill. App. 3d 704, 496 N.E.2d 1149 (1st Dist. 1986).
362. Id.
363. 107 Ill. 2d 130, 481 N.E.2d 716 (1985).
364. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 401(a)(2) (1985). Section 401(a)(2) provides in
pertinent part:
(a) The court shall enter a judgment of dissolution of marriage if at the time the
action was commenced, one of the spouses was a resident of this State... and if
one of the following grounds for dissolution has been proved:
(2) That the spouses lived separate and apart for a continuous period in excess
of 2 years and irreconcilable differences have caused the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage and the court determines that efforts at reconciliation
have failed or that future attempts at reconciliation would be impracticable and
not in the best interests of the family ....
365. Semmler, 107 Ill. 2d at 136-37, 481 N.E.2d at 719. See also In re Marriage of
Bates, 141 Ill. App. 3d 566, 569, 490 N.E.2d 1014, 1016 (2nd Dist. 1986) (citing Semmler
107 Ill. 2d at 136-37, 481 N.E. 2d at 719).
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pliance with the IMDMA,366 alleged a period of separation in excess of two years, although nearly all of the two-year period had
occurred prior to the effective date of the no-fault section of the
statute. 367 The wife contested the husband's petition, claiming that
he could not include as part of the required period of separation
the time of separation prior to the effective date of the no-fault
provision.3

68

The wife claimed the statute was unconstitutional be-

cause it applied a substantive right retroactively and interfered
with the vested rights she acquired when a previous petition was
denied.369
The court acknowledged that a presumption exists in favor of
prospective application of all legislation.370 When it is clear that
the legislature intended to apply a statute retroactively, the courts
must follow the legislative intent unless due process would be violated.371 The proper due process analysis requires a balancing of
the interests of the state against the interests of the individual.372
Applying these guidelines, the Semmler court found that the legislature intended for the no-fault provision to encompass periods of
separation which occurred before its passage. 73 The court noted
that the language and legislative history of the IMDMA indicated
that the purpose of the separation period is to insure that the family unit has indeed broken down and that reconciliation is impossible.3 74 Thus, the court concluded that the aim of the two year
separation period requirement is satisfied whether the separation
was prior to or subsequent to the effective date of the statute.375
The court noted that to hold otherwise would mean that those
spouses separating prior to July 2, 1984 would have to be separated
for a longer period of time than those who separated after the statute's effective date.376
366. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 401(a)(2) (Supp. 1984).
367. Semmler, 107 Ill. 2d at 134, 481 N.E.2d at 718. In July 1984, the husband filed
a two-count petition for dissolution. The first count alleged constructive desertion and
count two was based upon the no-fault provision which had become effective the day
before the filing. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. In 1979, the husband filed a petition for dissolution alleging mental cruelty.
The trial court denied the relief sought under the 1979 petition. Id. at 133, 481 N.E.2d at
718.
370. Id. at 136, 481 N.E.2d at 719.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 137-38, 481 N.E.2d at 720.
373. Id. at 136, 481 N.E.2d at 719.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 137, 481 N.E.2d at 719.
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Analyzing the due process balancing test, the Semmler court
concluded that the state interests outweighed the individual interests involved. 377 Access to no-fault dissolutions promotes the public interest.3 7 The separation requirement further protects that
interest by allowing for the possibilty of reconciliation. 1 7 The
state's objectives would be postponed for two years if retrospective
application of the statute had been denied. 380 The court noted that
the enactment of the no-fault provision was clearly foreseeable and
the wife in Semmler failed to allege that she had changed her position in reliance on the prior law. 38 1 The court reasoned, therefore,
that her interest was not abridged in such a way as to violate due
process. 38 2 Thus, the Semmler court held that the no-fault provision of the IMDMA permits a retroactive application of the required two-year separation period.383
B. Standing of Wards and Guardians
The IMDMA frequently must be interpreted in conjunction
with other Illinois statutes. The Illinois appellate courts, in In re
Marriageof Kutchins,384 and In re Marriageof Drews, 385 examined
the effect of incompetency and guardianship under the Probate Act
in dissolution proceedings.
Illinois follows the majority of states, holding that a mentally
incompetent person cannot sue for dissolution of marriage, either
on his own behalf or through a guardian or next friend.386 This
rule is based upon the idea that the decision to seek a dissolution of
marriage is so strictly personal that consent is a necessary prerequisite, and a mentally incompetent party is incapable of giving such
consent.38 The standards for determining mental capacity for an
appointment of an estate guardian and those for entering or dissolving a marriage, however, are not identical, 388 and the courts
377. Id. at 138, 481 N.E.2d at 720.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 138-39, 481 N.E.2d at 721.
381. Id. at 139, 481 N.E.2d at 720.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 141, 481 N.E.2d at 721.
384. 136 Ill. App. 3d 45, 482 N.E.2d 1005 (2nd Dist. 1985).
385. 139 Ill. App. 3d 763, 487 N.E.2d 1005 (1st Dist. 1986), aff'd, 113 Ill. 2d 201,
503 N.E.2d 339 (1986).
386. Kutchins, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 47, 482 N.E.2d at 1006 (citing lago v. lago, 168 Ill.
339 (1897); Bradford v. Abend, 89 Ill. 78 (1878)).
387. Kutchins, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 47, 482 N.E.2d at 1006.
388. Id. at 47, 482 N.E.2d at 1007.
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must balance the IMDMA and the Probate Act.389 In In re Marriage of Kutchins,3 9 ° the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second
District refused to permit a blanket application of one act to the
other.39 '
In Kutchins, the court held that a person found disabled and
placed under a "guardianship of the estate", pursuant to the Probate Act,3 92 does not necessarily lack the requisite legal capacity to
petition for a dissolution of his marriage.39 3 After a guardian was
appointed over his estate, the petitioner filed for dissolution of marriage. 394 The trial court dismissed the petition, 395 reasoning that
the petitioner lacked legal capacity to sue based upon the guardianship judgment declaring him disabled.396
The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision. 397 The
court asserted that while the petitioner was judged mentally incompetent for the purposes of handling his own financial affairs
under the Probate Act, this was not an indication that he did not
understand the nature of his petition for dissolution.3 98 The reviewing court, therefore, concluded that the appointment of a
guardian of an estate is not a finding of incompetency sufficient to
bar the ward from seeking a dissolution of marriage.399
While the Kutchins court stated that a person who has been
389. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1101/2, para. 1 la-3(a)(2) (1985).
390. 136 Il1. App. 3d 45, 482 N.E.2d 1005.
391. See id. at 47-49, 482 N.E.2d at 1006-08.
392. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1101/2, para. 1la-3 (1985). Section 1 la-3 provides:
(a) Upon the filing of a petition by a reputable person or by the alleged disabled
person himself or on its own motion, the court may adjudge a person to be a
disabled person and may appoint (1) a guardian of his person, if because of his
disability he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate
responsible decisions concerning the care of his person or (2) a guardian of his
estate, if because of his disability he is unable to manage his estate or financial
affairs or (3) a guardian of his person and his estate.
Id. (emphasis added).
393. Kutchins, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 47-48, 482 N.E.2d at 1007.
394. Id. at 49, 482 N.E.2d at 1008. In Kutchins, the petitioner had been placed under
a guardianship of the estate, although a guardianship of the person had been denied. Id.
at 46, 482 N.E.2d at 1006. The personal guardian has the duty to provide for the support,
care, comfort, health, education and maintenance of the ward and his minor and dependent adult children, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1101/2, para. 1la-17(a) (1985), while the estate
guardian has the duty of care, management and investment of the estate for the estate for
the comfort and suitable support and education of the ward and his minor and dependent
adult children. Id. at para. 1la-18(a).
395. Kutchins, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 46, 482 N.E.2d at 1006.
396. Id. at 46-47, 482 N.E.2d at 1006.
397. Id. at 49, 482 N.E.2d at 1008.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 47, 482 N.E.2d at 1006.
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placed under a guardianship of the estate may file a petition for
dissolution on his own behalf, the Illinois Appellate Court for the
First District, in In re Marriage of Drews, ° held that a guardian
lacks the power to institute dissolution proceedings on behalf of his
ward."° In Drews, the husband's legal guardian initiated a dissolution action by filing a petition for the dissolution of marriage on his
behalf." 2 The wife claimed that the petition was void because the
guardian's power did not encompass the personal decision to implement a dissolution of marriage. 40 3 The guardian, however, contended that her plenary guardianship placed upon her the duty for
the "care, management and investment of the ward's estate
and the
44
law."
by
required
things
all
do
to
ward
custody of the
The Drews court analyzed both the Probate Act and the
IMDMA, but stated that there was no statutory basis for either
party's contentions." ° The court determined that a guardian generally lacks the authority to institute an action for dissolution of a
ward's marriage when the ward is unable to form an intelligent
decision to seek such a dissolution." 6 In reaching this conclusion,
the Drews court emphasized the state's perceived interest in the
institution of marriage and the family relationship, together with
the personal nature of the decision to seek a dissolution of that
bond." 7
Nevertheless, the court left the door open for such litigation by
recognizing that there may at times be compelling reasons, as reflected in the Probate Act, 4°8 for allowing the courts to consider
400. Id. at 49, 482 N.E.2d at 1008.
401. 139 Il. App. 3d 763, 487 N.E.2d 1005 (1st Dist. 1986), aff'd, 113 Ill. 2d 201,
503 N.E.2d 339 (1986).
402. Id. at 765, 487 N.E.2d at 1007.
403. Id. at 766, 487 N.E.2d at 1006. The petition sought dissolution of the marriage,
distribution of the marital estate, and the award of maintenance and attorney fees. Id.
404. Id. at 767, 487 N.E.2d at 1007.
405. Id. at 767, 487 N.E.2d at 1007-08. The guardian also urged the court to extend
application of the substituted judgment doctrine to the context of marriage dissolution
proceedings. Id. at 775, 487 N.E.2d at 1013. The doctrine of substituted judgment requires the court to step into the mental position of the incompetent, substituting the
motives and considerations of the incompetent for its own. Id. Under contemporary
analysis, the doctrine has been expanded in order to provide justification for the authorization of certain medical treatments by the guardian on behalf of the ward. Id. The court
in Drews, however, found that the particular facts lacked any indication that the ward
would have desired a dissolution and refused to accept the expansion of this doctrine to a
dissolution proceeding. Id. at 776, 487 N.E.2d at 1013.
406. Id. at 767-70, 487 N.E.2d at 1008-10.
407. Id. at 774, 487 N.E.2d at 1012.
408. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1101/2, para. 1 la-3(b) (1985). The compelling reasons stated
in section 1la-3(b) include the protection of the disabled person from neglect, exploita-
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such an action. 4 9 The court, however, found no such facts in this
4 10
case.
The personal aspects of marriage and dissolution have been the
historical basis for many decisions in the family law area. Recent
Illinois decisions illustrate that the practical implications which
flow from marriage and dissolution must also be considered. As
noted by the Semmler court, dissolution creates a set of substantive
rights protected by due process." ' These rights belong to the petitioners as well as to the respondents. The parties have the right to a
distribution of the marital assets and property, each entitled to his
just proportion. Had the Semmler court refused to permit the retroactive application of the no-fault statute, the petitioner's rights in
any property or its value may have been substantially affected by
an additional two year delay. Though a ward possesses the same
substantive rights to the assets of the marriage as the competent
party, the Drews decision refused to permit a ward the same ability
to adjudicate his rights. A ward may be a party to a dissolution as
a respondent, but he may not actively seek a dissolution of his marriage through the actions of his guardian.

VIII.

GRANDPARENTAL VISITATION

Under current Illinois law, grandparents have the right to seek
and be granted visitation with their grandchildren pursuant to a
petition for dissolution of the marriage involving the childrens'
parents.4 '1 2 During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the novel issue of grandparental visitation when a parent
has been deprived of his parental rights under the Illinois Adoption
tion, or abuse, and to encourage development of his maximum self-reliance and independence." Id.
409. Id. The court stated:
[W]e are equally mindful of the consideration that dissolution of a marriage has
an enormous impact not only upon the ward, but also upon the ward's spouse.
Dissolution severs, terminates and extinguishes an entire panapoly of legal, social, family, and personal rights, benefits, advantages and opportunities. Given
the magnitude of these consequences, we determine that the decision to so radically transmute a relationship is usually best exercised by the partners to the
marriage, rather than by someone alien to it.
Id. at 774-75, 487 N.E.2d at 1012-13.
410. Drews, 139 Ill. App. 3d at 776, 487 N.E.2d at 1014.
411. Semmler, 107 111. 2d 130, 136-40, 481 N.E.2d 716, 719-21.
412. Lingwall v. Hoener, 108 Ill. 2d 206, 210-11, 483 N.E.2d 512, 514 (1986) (citing
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 607(b) (1985)). Section 607(b) states in part: "the court
may grant reasonable visitation to a grandparent or great-grandparent of any minor child
upon the grandparent's or great-grandparent's petition to the court.., if the court determines that it is in the best interests and welfare of the child ...."
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Act.4 13

In Lingwall v. Hoener,414 the Illinois Supreme Court held that
the statutory termination of a natural parent's rights when the
other natural parent and that parent's new spouse ("stepparent")
adopt the child does not, as a matter of law, terminate the rights of
grandparents.4 1 In that case, the respondents challenged the
grandparent's visitation rights, urging the court to rely upon the
section of the Illinois Adoption Act which terminates the non-custodial parent's visitation rights after a child has been adopted by
the stepparent.4 16 The respondents argued that this provision
served to extinguish the grandparents' visitation rights after adoption as well.417
The Lingwall court asserted that while the Adoption Act governs adoption and removes some issues from the continuing jurisdiction of the court that granted the divorce,41 s the IMDMA
continues to govern other issues connected with divorce.41 9 These
issues may include support and property settlements, as well as
grandparental visitation when the child has been subsequently
adopted by the stepparent.420
The court noted that the respondents' arguments failed to recog413. Lingwall, 108 Il1. 2d 206, 483 N.E.2d 512; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1521
(1985).
414. Lingwall, 108 Il1. 2d 206, 483 N.E.2d 512.
415. Id. at 210, 216, 483 N.E.2d at 514, 517. The Adoption Act states that when a
husband or wife desire to adopt the child of the other spouse, the adoption shall be by
both spouses jointly. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1502(2)(A)(a) (1985). The requirement of adoption by the natural parent is not considered in this article.
416. Lingwall, 108 Ill. 2d at 211, 483 N.E.2d at 515. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, para.
1521 (1985) provides in part:
After the entry either of an order terminating parental rights or the entry of
an order of adoption, the natural parents of a child sought to be adopted shall
be relieved of all parental responsibility for such child and shall be deprived of
all legal rights as respects the child, and the child shall be free from all obligations of maintenance and obedience as respects such natural parents.
The respondents also relied upon a portion of the Probate Act, which provides that
grandparental visitation rights may be granted only if the minor has not been adopted
and if that visitation would not be detrimental to the best interests and welfare of the
minor. Id. (citing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110 '/2, para. 11-7.1 (1985)). The court disposed of
this argument because the Probate Act applies when both parents of a minor are deceased
and the adoption necessarily involves persons other than the child's parents. This is a
different factual situation than the present case where the adoption is by one of the parents as well as a stepparent. Id. at 212, 483 N.E.2d at 515.
417. Id. at 211, 483 N.E.2d at 515.
418. Id. at 211-12, 483 N.E.2d at 515.
419. Id. at 212, 483 N.E.2d at 515. The issues excluded by the Adoption Act include
custody, child support, and parental visitation. Id.
420. Id. at 212-13, 483 N.E.2d at 515.
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nize the inherent differences between an adoption by strangers and
an adoption by a stepparent. 2 ' The natural parents of an adopted
child may be required to support the child after adoption if the
adoptive parents are unable to do so.4 2 2 Moreover, an adopted
child may inherit through the estate of the natural parents.423 The
parental relationship is not completely severed, as the respondents
presumed.424
The Lingwall court also noted that the respondents failed to recognize that both the IMDMA and the Adoption Act proceed on
the basic statutory "best interest of the child" standard. 425 The
standard does change, however, when the child is adopted by
strangers rather than adopted by the stepparent.426 In an adoption
by strangers, maximizing the pool of potential adoptive parents is a
basic policy concern.4 27 The termination of the rights and responsibilities of the natural parents accomplishes this goal by guaranteeing that the adoptive parents will have an opportunity to create
a stable family environment free from outside intrusion.42 This
policy is inapplicable in the adoption by the new stepparent, because the act of becoming a stepparent usually occurs before adoption, and regardless of the previously established visitation rights
between the child and the natural parent.429 The court thus determined that the termination of the parental relationship is a legal
fiction created specifically for the "adoption by strangers" situation.43° The Lingwall court refused to apply the fiction to the termination of grandparental visitation rights when the child is
adopted by the stepparent unless such termination would be in the
child's best interest.43 '
In granting visitation privileges to a grandparent under section
607(b),43 2 when the grandchild has been adopted by the stepparent,
421. Id.
422. Id. at 213, 483 N.E.2d at 515.
423. See Dwyer v. Dwyer, 366 Ill. 630, 634, 10 N.E.2d 344, 346 (1937) (natural parent may, if necessary, be required to assume the duty of supporting of his minor child).
424. See In re Estate of Tilliski, 390 Ill. 273, 285, 61 N.E.2d 24, 29 (1945) (natural
child has a right to inherit from the natural parent regardless of that child's previous
adoption).
425. Lingwall, 108 Ill. 2d at 213, 483 N.E.2d at 515-16.
426. Id. at 213, 483 N.E.2d at 516.
427. Id. at 213-14, 483 N.E.2d at 516.
428. Id. at 214, 483 N.E.2d at 516.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. There is no reason to assume that grandparental visitation is in the child's best
interest; likewise, there is no presumption that grandparental visitation would harm the
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the Lingwall court relied solely on an evaluation of the child's best
interests. This standard illustrates a practical balancing between
the IMDMA and the Adoption Act. Because of the difference between adoption by a stepparent and adoption by a stranger, however, the Lingwall decision probably will be applied only to the
adoption of a child under the former scenario.
IX.

A.

LEGISLATION

Spousal Health Insurance Rights Act

The Spousal Health Insurance Rights Act ("SHIRA" or the
"Act"), 433 effective December 1, 1985, provides for the continuation of insurance coverage for the former spouse and dependent
children of an employee covered under an employer-provided
group policy. Prior to passage of the Act, divorced and widowed
spouses were entitled to continued coverage despite the divorce or
death of the other spouse.4 34 The benefits, however, could be substantially reduced because of age or prior medical problems, and
the premiums could be extraordinarily high in comparison to the
coverage received.433 Under the new Act, the same coverage will
continue at a premium cost equal to the amount formerly contributed by the employer and employee, with some modification made
child. Id. at 214-15, 483 N.E.2d at 516. Additionally, the court presented factors courts
should consider when determining whether a grandparent and grandchild relationship
would be in the best interest of the child:
Of course the child's best interest is not entirely severable from the interests
of the parents in a reconstituted family, and certainly the parent's attitude toward grandparental visitation is an important factor for the court to consider in
determining whether such visitation should be ordered. However, their attitude
is not the only, or even the paramount, consideration. Such factors as the
length and quality of the relationship between the grandparents and child, the
child's need for continuity in his relationships with people who may have
played a significant nurturing role in his life, and the effect of the termination of
the child's relationship with the parent who has relinquished his rights and responsibilities must also be considered. These factors will certainly outweigh the
opposition of parents that is based on the mere inconvenience to them of such
visits, or on their animosity toward the child's natural parent.
Id. at 215, 483 N.E.2d at 516-17. The court further concluded that such a determination
is to be made by the court granting the dissolution. Id. at 215, 483 N.E.2d at 517.
433. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 979.2 (1985).
434. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 979.2(A) (1983).
435. Yavitz, Spousal Health Insurance Rights Act Passes Legislature, 8 ILL. FAM. L.
REP. 227 (1985). For example, an employed spouse has group health insurance that includes major medical coverage at a cost of $243 per month for the family. Once divorced,
the unemployed spouse may be unable to find insurance because of age or previous health
problems. Otherwise, insurance may be obtained at a maximum rate because of these
reasons. Under the previous law the group insurer could offer a conversion policy paying
maximum benefits less than $12,000 to the unemployed spouse for $81 per month. Id.
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when the former or widowed spouse reaches age fifty-five.4 3 6
To qualify for coverage under SHIRA, the former spouse must
notify both the employer and the insurance company, within thirty
days from the dissolution of the marriage or the death of the employee, of the desire to continue the coverage.437 The employer is
required to notify the insurance company within fifteen days of the
receipt of this notice from the former spouse and to send a copy of
this notice to the former spouse.4 3 8 The insurance company then
has thirty days from receipt of the notice of the former spouse or
the employer to send, by certified mail, notification to the former
spouse that coverage may be continued.4 39 This notice must include an election form, the premium amount, and instructions for
completing and returning the election form."' If the insurance
company fails to notify the former spouse, all benefits will continue
and all premiums will be waived from the date notice was to be
sent until it is actually sent. 441 If, however, the former spouse fails
to exercise the election by notifying the insurer by certified mail,
within thirty days of the date the insurer mailed the notice, or fails
to pay the premium amount within thirty days of receipt of the
2
notice, the right to continue receiving benefits will terminate."
The provisions for continued coverage apply to health care service corporations, 44 3 medical service plan corporations, 4' the Voluntary Health Services Plans Act," 5 vision service plan
corporations, 446 dental service plan corporations, 44 7 and pharmaceutical plan corporations. 4 8 The new law exempts self-insured
employers, employee benefit trust funds, and other ERISA exempt
organizations, as well as employers whose policies are written in
another state. 449
The Act contains significant eligibility and termination provisions. If the former spouse is under age fifty-five, the coverage au436.
437.
438.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 979.2(D), (E).
Id. at para. 979.2(B).
Id.

439. Id. at para. 979.2(C).
440. Id. at para. 979.2(C)(i)(ii)(iii).
441. Id. at para. 979.2(C).
442. Id. at para. 979.2(C)(iii).
443. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 562a.6-1(1), (2) (1985).
444. Id. at para. 572.
445. Id. at para. 604.
446. Id. at para. 682.
447. Id. at para. 690.47.
448. Id. at para. 691.46.
449. Yavitz, supra note 435, at 228.
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tomatically ceases after two years,450 or when the former spouse
fails to pay the premium, remarries, becomes an insured employee
under another group health plan, or when the coverage would
otherwise terminate under the policy as if the parties were still
married.4"' If the former spouse is age fifty-five or older, the premium amount will remain the same as would be contributed by the
employer and the employee for the first two years of coverage.4 5 2
At that time the monthly premium may be increased by an amount
4 53
not to exceed twenty percent for the costs of administration.
The dates for termination are the same as for those persons under
age fifty-five, except that the two year limit is removed and the
outside limitation on coverage is when the party becomes eligible

for Medicare benefits.454
Congress has enacted a federal form of SHIRA, the Consoli455
dated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("COBRA").
Though there is some overlapping coverage, differences exist where
45 6
one statute grants coverage in areas not covered by the other.
Thus, the practitioner must be aware of the balance between the
federal and state acts.457
B.

Maintenance and Child Support Amendments

The IMDMA was amended effective September 25, 1985, to repeal the use of minimum percentage guidelines as the basis for determining imaintenance obligations. Those provisions regarding
the formula for determining child support payments under the
450. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 979.2(D)(v) (1985). It has been noted that while
the two year expiration period is rather restrictive, the compromise was necessary for
passage of the Act. The expiration period may be amended by future legislatures. Yavitz,
supra note 435, at 227.
451. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 979.2(D) (1985). A protection period under the
Act provides that the existing coverage can not be modified or terminated during the first
120 days from the date of the dissolution or the death of the spouse. Id. at para.
979.2(D)(ii), (ii).
452. Id. at para. 979.2(E).
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1161-1168 (West Supp. 1986).
456. Yavitz, FederalSpousal Health Insurance, 9 ILL. FAM. L. REP. 134-36 (1986).
For example, SHIRA applies only to health insurance policies issued or delivered in Illinois which are regulated by the Illinois Insurance Code. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para.
979.2(A). COBRA applies to self-insureds, union plans, HMO's, and other state and
government group health plans written in other states. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1167(1) (West
Supp. 1987). SHIRA provides for a two year continuation of coverage for spouses under
age 55, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 979.2 (D)(v), while COBRA provides a three year
continuation to all who qualify, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1162(2)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1987).
457. Yavitz, supra note 456, at 136.
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minimum percentage guidelines also were amended. The amended
act further requires that all final orders setting child support state
the specific dollar amount of support.45 8
The legislature deleted the provisions of the maintenance section
of the IMDMA which set forth minimum guidelines in cases involving child support and maintenance.459 The removal of this
mandatory language leaves determinations of maintenance payments to judicial consideration of the statutorily relevant factors
enunciated in the Act."
The child support section of the IMDMA as amended applies
only to child support orders, changing the previous law's application to maintenance as well.4 6 ' The legislature also changed the
significance of the relevant statutory factors used for determining
awards of child support. Under the present Act, the factors for
consideration are to be used in determining whether deviation from
the statutory guidelines is appropriate,462 rather than for making
threshold inquiries. The amendment requires the court to make
express findings when it makes an award lower than the statutory
requirement. 463 The court, however, may continue to make awards

higher than those prescribed by the statute or recognize an award
by agreement
of the parties without being required to make express
46
findings.

Under the amended Act, the figures used for calculating child
support awards will be based upon a percentage of the supporting
party's net income4 6 as opposed to the previous "percent of income [net]" determination.466 Net income is defined under section
505(a)(3) of the IMDMA as the total of all income minus only the
deductions the legislature has statutorily permitted for the purposes of this Act.4 67 The statute now provides that only those
mandatory retirement contributions which are "required by law as
a condition of employment" may be considered deductible. 468 Ad-

ditionally, the reasonable costs of adding a child to the supporting
parent's existing insurance policy under a court order may be de458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40,
Id. at para. 504(b).
Id. at 504(b)(1-7).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40,
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at para. 505(a)(1).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40,
Id. at para. 505(a)(3)(d).

para. 505(a)(5) (Supp. 1986).
para. 505(a) (1985).

para. 505(a) (Supp. 1984).
para. 505(a)(3) (Supp. 1986).
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ducted.469 The court also may reduce net income by the amount of
expenditures for repayment of employment or business debts and
expenses, necessary medical expenses and reasonable expenditures
for the benefit of the child and the other parent, excluding gifts.470
These deductions will be allowed only for the period that such payments are due and and will be modified by operation of law.471
Further deductions are permitted for federal and state income tax,
social security payments, union dues, dependent and individual
health or hospitalization insurance premiums, and prior court ordered 72obligations of support or maintenance which are actually
paid.

4

The relationship between the minimum support guidelines and
the list of statutory factors contained in the Act is clarified by this
amendment. 4 73 The courts are now directed to apply the guidelines

unless a departure is justified by an examination of the relevant
factors. Therefore, practitioners arguably may assume that prior
case law relating to the application and interpretation of the statutory factors will control child support awards where the court is
asked to depart from the statutory guidelines.
X.

CONCLUSION

Family law practitioners are awaiting the effects and possible
controversies surrounding the enactment of SHIRA and the
amendments respecting maintenance and child support. With regard to dissolution, the courts have clung to their traditional philosophy that the personal nature of a dissolution action precludes a
guardian from filing such an action on behalf of his ward. While
judicial treatment of dissolution has remained narrow, the courts
have expanded in other areas, such as the visitation rights of
grandparents and the support duties of non-custodial parents. The
upcoming Survey year also promises to be a blend of traditional
principles and new developments.

469. Id. at para. 505(a)(4).
470. Id. at para. 505(a)(3)(h).
471. Id.
472. Id. at para. 505(a)(3)(a)-(g). The previous $25 per month cap on the deduction
of premiums for individual health/hospitalization insurance coverage has been removed.
See id. at para. 505(a).
473. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 40, para. 505, Hist. & Prac. Notes (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1986).

